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Abstract 
Torbjørn Hægeland and Jarle Møen 
Input additionality in the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme  
 
Reports 2007/47 • Statistics Norway 2007 
Tax incentives have become an increasingly popular policy tool over the last decades. Norway introduced an R&D tax 
credit scheme, called SkatteFUNN, in 2002. The degree of input additionality, i.e. to what extent the scheme induces 
firms to invest more in R&D than they otherwise would have done, is critical when evaluating the overall efficiency of 
the scheme. Identifying this effect in a non-experimental setting, where access to the scheme is in principle universal, 
is demanding. We discuss in detail the identification problems involved. Using a difference-in-difference regression 
approach, comparing growth in R&D investments for firms above and below the 4 million tax credit cap, our findings 
suggest that the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme has stimulated firms to increase their R&D investments. The 
estimated effect seems to be driven by firms that did very little R&D prior to the introduction of the tax credit scheme 
was introduced. The size of the effect is hard to assess with any precision, but the scheme seems to induce about 
two kroner additional R&D per krone spent as tax subsidy. 
 
 
Acknowledgement: This is a part of Statistics Norway’s evaluation of the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme, 
financed by the Norwegian Research Council. 
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Et hovedformål med SkatteFUNN-ordningen er at den 
skal bidra til å øke FoU-investeringene i næringslivet. I 
en evaluering av ordningen veier derfor spørsmålet om 
innsatsaddisjonalitet tungt. Det er en nødvendig 
betingelse for at SkatteFUNN-ordningen skal kunne 
betegnes som en suksess at den fører til at foretakene 
faktisk utfører mer FoU enn de ville ha gjort i fravær av 
ordningen. Hvis ikke SkatteFUNN utløser mer FoU, 
hjelper det for eksempel lite at ordningen 
administreres på en effektiv og oversiktlig måte. 
 
Vi skal besvare et tilsynelatende enkelt spørsmål: Har 
innføringen av SkatteFUNN ført til at FoU-inves-
teringene i næringslivet har økt? Når man skal besvare 
et slikt spørsmål, støter man raskt på store metodo-
logiske utfordringer. For å finne ut hvor mye 
SkatteFUNN har bidratt til å øke foretakenes FoU-
investeringer, må vi gjennomføre en kontrafaktisk 
analyse. Vi må sammenligne det faktiske nivået på 
FoU-investeringene med det nivået som ville ha blitt 
realisert i fravær av SkatteFUNN-ordningen. Ideelt sett 
bør et slikt spørsmål besvares ved bruk av et kontrol-
lert eksperiment. Man ville da ha delt foretakspopula-
sjonen i to tilfeldige grupper, hvorav den ene fikk 
tilbud om skattefradrag for FoU-investeringer, mens 
den andre var en kontrollgruppe. Dette er imidlertid 
ikke mulig. SkatteFUNN-ordningen er ikke et kontrol-
lert eksperiment, men en ordning som gjelder for alle 
foretak. Utfordringen i en ikke-eksperimentell situasjon 
er å utlede fra historiske data hva som ville vært 
situasjonen uten innføringen av SkatteFUNN. Generelt 
sett har man ingen garanti for at historiske data kan 
avsløre hva som ville ha skjedd under et annet 
politikkregime. 
 
En innfallsvinkel man kunne tenke seg å benytte, er en 
sammenlikning av utviklingen i FoU-investeringer for 
de foretakene som benytter seg av SkatteFUNN-
ordningen med utviklingen for de som ikke gjør det. En 
slik tilnærming vil imidlertid være langt fra idealet om 
at behandlings- og kontrollgruppen skal være tilfeldig 
trukne. Det er høyst sannsynlig at de som har gode 
forskningsideer og dermed ser muligheter for profit-
able FoU-investeringer, i større grad vil benytte 
ordningen enn de som ikke har det. I en slik situasjon 
er det ikke mulig å bruke FoU-investeringene til foretak 
som ikke benytter seg av SkatteFUNN-ordningen som 
et anslag på hva FoU-investeringene i SkatteFUNN-
foretak ville vært i fravær av ordningen.  
 
Vår foretrukne strategi for å identifisere effekten av 
SkatteFUNN, er å benytte oss av en såkalt “dis-
kontinuitet” som er innebygd i ordningen. Skatte-
fradrag for FoU gjennom SkatteFUNN er begrenset til 
investeringer på inntil 4 millioner kroner for egenutført 
FoU og inntil 8 millioner kroner hvis det er samar-
beidsprosjekter med en godkjent FoU-institusjon. 
Foretak som ville ha investert mer enn disse beløps-
grensene i fravær av SkatteFUNN, får ikke noe direkte 
insentiv gjennom SkatteFUNN til å øke sine FoU-
investeringene. Det marginale FoU-prosjektet deres får 
ikke redusert sin pris. (Disse foretakene har selvsagt 
insentiv til å søke SkatteFUNN for de prosjektene de 
ville ha gjennomført uansett). Foretak som ville ha 
investert mindre enn beløpsgrensene, har derimot et 
insentiv til å øke sine investeringer som følge av 
SkatteFUNN, siden SkatteFUNN gjør deres marginale 
FoU-prosjekt billigere. De får et subsidium på 18 eller 
20 øre av hver ekstra krone de investerer i FoU opp til 
beløpsgrensen. Dette vil antakelig føre til at noen pro-
sjekter som ville blitt ansett for å være bedriftsøko-
nomisk ulønnsomme i fravær av SkatteFUNN, nå anses 
som bedriftsøkonomisk lønnsomme. Det er mulig å 
anta at hvorvidt et foretak ville ha investert mer eller 
mindre enn beløpsgrensen i fravær av SkatteFUNN til 
en viss grad er tilfeldig. Vår hovedstrategi for å identifi-
sere effekten av SkatteFUNN er derfor å sammenlikne 
veksten i FoU-investeringer for de to gruppene av 
foretak og anta at forskjellen kan tilskrives at den ene 
gruppen er subsidiert på marginen mens den andre 
ikke er det. Vi antar altså at foretakenes vekst i FoU-
investeringer i fravær av SkatteFUNN ikke er syste-
matisk relatert til om de ville ha investert over eller 
under beløpsgrensen. Dette er ikke en triviell forut-
setning. Det er ikke åpenbart at foretak med små og 
store FoU-investeringer har den samme forventede 
vekstraten i fravær av ordningen. Hvis det i tillegg er 
slik at FoU-investeringene for hvert enkelt foretak 
tenderer til å variere rundt et “typisk” nivå, vil 
observerte vekstrater kunne være influert av såkalt 
Summary in Norwegian
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“regression to the mean”. Dette innebærer at foretak 
som et år har et uvanlig høyt investeringsnivå, vil ha 
større sannsynlighet for å bli klassifisert som “over 
beløpsgrensen”, samtidig som de trolig vil redusere 
FoU-investeringene i neste periode, og motsatt. For å 
redusere dette problemet, klassifiserer vi foretak som 
over eller under beløpsgrensen basert på all tilgjengelig 
historisk informasjon om deres FoU-investeringer før 
SkatteFUNN ble innført.  
 
I hoveddelen av våre analyser er to-gruppesammen-
likningen beskrevet ovenfor inkorporert i et regresjons-
rammeverk. Dette har flere fordeler. For det første kan 
vi inkludere flere kontrollvariable. Dette øker sammen-
liknbarheten mellom de to gruppene, ved at vi kontrol-
lerer for systematiske forskjeller i observerte faktorer 
som også påvirker FoU-investeringene. For det andre 
kan vi benytte alle tilgjengelige observasjoner på en 
systematisk måte, ikke bare én observasjon før og én 
etter at ordningen ble innført. I tillegg kan vi ved å 
bruke et regresjonsrammeverk besvare mer spesifikke 
spørsmål, f.eks. hvorvidt effektene er forskjellige på 
kort og lang sikt, eller om spesielle foretakskjennetegn 
er assosiert med høy eller lav addisjonalitet. Det er 
likevel verd å understreke at de utfordringene vi har 
drøftet ovenfor knyttet til identifikasjon av effekten av 
SkatteFUNN-ordningen ikke kan løses ved en 
regresjonsteknikk i seg selv. 
  
Vår hovedanalyse tar utgangspunkt i SSBs FoU-under-
søkelse. Denne datakilden har sine åpenbare fordeler, 
blant annet at den også omfatter foretak som aldri har 
søkt SkatteFUNN, at opplysningene om FoU er gitt i en 
sammenheng som i utgangspunktet ikke har noe som 
helst med SkatteFUNN-ordningen å gjøre, og at opplys-
ningene går tilbake til lenge før SkatteFUNN ble inn-
ført. Et problem ved bruk av denne datakilden er 
imidlertid at en vesentlig del av SkatteFUNN-fore-
takene og SkatteFUNN-prosjektene faller utenfor ana-
lysen, siden FoU-undersøkelsen omfatter foretak med 
minst 10 ansatte, og en stor andel av SkatteFUNN-
midlene, både målt i skattefradrag/tilskudd og i antall 
prosjekter, faktisk går til små foretak. Funn fra 
analysen basert på FoU-statistikken, kan ikke uten 
videre generaliseres til de mindre foretakene, selv om 
mange av de samme insentivene og beslutnings-
mekanismene nok også gjør seg gjeldende for disse. Vi 
benytter derfor også data fra SkatteFUNN-databasen. 
Denne er i utgangspunktet mindre egnet, men gir 
informasjon om alle søkere. Resultatene basert på 
denne datakilden samsvarer godt med det vi finner ved 
bruk av data fra FoU-undersøkelsen. 
 
Siden et av målene med SkatteFUNN-ordningen er å 
øke FoU-investeringene gjennom å stimulere flere 
foretak til å drive med FoU, er det fra et evaluerings-
messig synspunkt uheldig å utelate foretak som aldri 
før har gjort FoU fra utvalget. Vi velger imidlertid å se 
på disse foretakene i en separat analyse, siden 
beslutningen om å investere i FoU for første gang kan 
være en ganske annerledes enn beslutningen om å 
endre nivået på FoU-investeringene.  
 
Gjennom analyse av data på foretaksnivå finner vi at 
foretak som har mottatt støtte gjennom SkatteFUNN 
har sterkere vekst i sine FoU-investeringer enn andre 
foretak. En medvirkende årsak til dette resultatet er 
trolig at foretak med gode forskningsideer selvselek-
terer seg inn i ordningen. Vår hovedstrategi for å løse 
dette problemet er forklart ovenfor, og våre viktigste 
funn kan oppsummeres slik:  
• Foretak som tidligere investerte mindre enn beløps-
grensen for fradrag har økt sine FoU-investeringer 
mer enn foretak som tidligere lå over beløpsgrensen 
og dermed ikke fikk et direkte insentiv til å øke sine 
investeringer gjennom SkatteFUNN. 
• De økte FoU-investeringene til foretak under 
beløpsgrensen reflekterer ikke bare økt rapportert 
FoU, men viser seg også ved at 
arbeidskraftsinnsatsen slik den rapporteres til 
offentlige registre øker for gitt produksjon. 
• Den estimerte positive addisjonaliteten er i 
hovedsak drevet av foretak som investerte svært lite 
i FoU før SkatteFUNN ble innført. 
• Addisjonaliteten synes sterkest i små foretak, 
foretak i desentrale strøk, foretak hvor de 
sysselsatte har lavt relativt utdanningsnivå og 
foretak i næringer som tradisjonelt er lite 
forskningsintensive. Dette er sterkt relatert til 
foregående punkt. 
• Foretak som gjør lite FoU får relativt sett mer 
subsidier ut av ordningen enn foretak som gjør mye 
FoU – selv om man bare sammenligner foretak 
under beløpsgrensen for fradrag. Dette er 
konsistent med ordningens popularitet blant svært 
små foretak. Det er ikke nødvendigvis et problem, 
men man kan mistenke at enkelte foretak med lite 
FoU tilpasser seg regelverket på en måte som ikke 
var tilsiktet.  
• Foretak som tidligere ikke investerte i FoU har hatt 
høyere sannsynlighet for å begynne å investere i 
FoU etter at SkatteFUNN ble innført. 
• Foretak som tidligere investerte i FoU har hatt 
høyere sannsynlighet for å fortsette med FoU etter 
at SkatteFUNN ble innført 
• SkatteFUNN ser ikke ut til å ha hatt noen sterk 
effekt på samarbeid med eksterne FoU-institusjoner. 
• Analysene gir ikke noe entydig svar på om 
addisjonaliteten er sterkere på lang sikt enn på kort 
sikt. Teoretiske betraktninger tilsier at dette bør 
være tilfelle. 
• Selvrapportert addisjonalitet fra søknader og 
sluttrapporter samt Innovasjon Norges 
prosjektvurderinger samsvarer kvalitativt med de 
økonometriske analysene. 
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I sum tolker vi de empiriske resultatene til å være 
konsistente med at SkatteFUNN-ordningen har stimulert 
til økte FoU-investeringer i norske foretak.  
 
Hovedresultatene er stort sett konsistente på tvers av 
datakilder og modellspesifikasjoner. Imidlertid må vi 
på nytt minne om at identifikasjonsstrategien ikke er 
vanntett, og at en kausal tolkning av resultatene hviler 
på antakelser som neppe holder eksakt. Effektene er 
estimert med betydelig usikkerhet, og størrelsen på 
estimatene er sensitive overfor behandlingen av de 
foretakene som rapporterte minst FoU før SkatteFUNN. 
De kvantitative resultatene i vår analyse må derfor 
brukes med varsomhet. 
 
Når det er sagt er det likevel interessant å beregne hva 
våre estimater betyr med hensyn til hvor mye ekstra 
FoU som genereres i forhold til hvor mye myndig-
hetene deler ut i støtte. Som et referansepunkt kan det 
nevnes at et prosjekt som foretas av et foretak under 
beløpsgrensen, og som ikke ville blitt utført i det hele 
tatt dersom det ikke fikk støtte, har en addisjonalitet 
pr. støttekrone på 1/0,20=5 hvis fradragsprosenten er 
20 og 1/0,18=5,56 hvis den er 18. Et prosjekt som 
ville ha blitt gjennomført uansett har addisjonalitet pr 
støttekrone lik null. Ethvert estimat på addisjonalitet pr 
støttekrone som er lavere enn 5, innebærer dermed et 
effektivitetstap i og med at det koster å drive inn 
skattekroner og noen av disse har gått til prosjekter 
som uansett ville blitt gjennomført. Dette er det 
imidlertid vanskelig å unngå. En addisjonalitet større 
enn 1 regnes vanligvis som akseptabelt i internasjonale 
evalueringer.  
 
Basert på de ulike estimater fra våre økonometriske 
undersøkelser finner vi addisjonalitet pr støttekrone 
mellom 1,3 og 2,9. Det knytter seg som nevnt betydelig 
usikkerhet til disse estimatene. Siden de ulike estima-
tene ikke er uavhengige knytter usikkerheten seg til 
hele intervallet og blir ikke borte ved at man velger et 
midtpunkt. Skal vi imidlertid gi en beste gjetning på 
privat FoU-vekst per skattekrone brukt, må denne 
likevel bli i størrelsesorden 2. 
 
Gitt det positive bildet som avtegner seg i våre mikro-
økonometriske analyser, kan den svake veksten i 
aggregert FoU etter 2002 synes overraskende. Dette 
kan indikere at vårt anslag på addisjonaliteten ligger 
noe høyt. Men for det første er det mulig at makro-
bildet ville sett mer negativt ut uten SkatteFUNN. For 
det andre er ikke forholdet mellom totale FoU-
investeringer og størrelsen på subsidien slik at man kan 
forvente en veldig sterk makroeffekt. 
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Policies to stimulate innovation and economic growth 
are high on the policy agenda in all OECD-countries. A 
strong link between investments in research and 
growth is often taken for granted, and many countries 
have explicit and ambitious goals regarding the 
economy’s R&D intensity. Setting such goals suggests 
there is a role for government intervention, and there 
are many potential market failures in the market for 
research and development. In theory, these could lead 
to overinvestment as well as underinvestment, but 
based on empirical research there is a fairly broad 
consensus that a free market underinvests in R&D.1  
 
There are many policy tools available to improve upon 
the market outcome. First, governments may produce 
R&D themselves. Second, intellectual property right 
laws, ensuring that investors are able to capture the 
rents from innovations, are very important. Third, 
there are several important links between competition 
policies and innovation. Fourth, well regulated capital 
markets are crucial, and there may also be a role for 
public money in order to secure funding of new 
ventures. Finally, the government may subsidize R&D 
investments made by private firms. OECD countries use 
large sums on R&D subsidies, and it receives consider-
able attention in the public debate. However, there is 
no strong consensus regarding the effectiveness of such 
policies.  
 
R&D subsidies can be given as R&D tax credits or 
through direct grants.2 Tax incentives have become an 
increasingly popular policy tool over the last decades, 
and in several countries it is a very important supple-
ment to direct R&D subsidies. In both cases, the aim of 
the policy from the point of view of the government is 
to subsidize private R&D projects that would not have 
been undertaken without a subsidy, and where the 
                                                     
1 See Griliches (2000) for a broad survey and Wieser (2005) for a 
recent meta-analysis.  
2 See Hall and van Reenen (2000), David, Hall and Toole (2000) 
and Garcia-Quevedo (2004) for useful surveys. See also Bloom, 
Griffith and van Reenen (2002) for an authoritative empirical 
analysis of R&D tax credits. 
 
social rate of return is above the risk adjusted required 
rate of return on public investments.  
 
If the government had perfect information, direct 
subsidies would be the preferred tool, as projects could 
be given support based on their social rate of return. 
An R&D tax credit would be less efficient, as firms rank 
projects according to their private returns. Substantial 
subsidies (financed by tax revenue) will then be paid 
to projects that would have been undertaken without a 
subsidy, and where spillovers to other firms or con-
sumers may be small. This implies that under a tax 
credit there is (i) a deadweight loss, since some of the 
subsidies are pure transfers financed by tax revenues, 
and (ii) a non-optimal mix of projects undertaken 
because firms decide what projects to do themselves.  
However, public servants do not have perfect infor-
mation, and acquiring information on private and 
particularly social returns is costly. Submitting detailed 
information on projects is also costly for firms. 
Depending on how the tax credit scheme is set up, 
administering subsidies through R&D tax credits may 
be cheaper for both government and firms. This is one 
main advantage of using tax credits for R&D. Another 
main advantage is that R&D tax credits reduce the 
price on R&D investments. Hence, there is a strong 
theoretical case for thinking that R&D investments will 
increase. With direct R&D grants, firms’ first priority 
will be to get subsidies for projects they would under-
take in any case. The degree of “additionality” will 
depend on the quality of public servants and the 
honesty of firms. Since R&D subsidies are awarded 
through a discretionary process, it is also more 
vulnerable to lobbying, which may be a serious 
drawback. Furthermore, grants may be more 
vulnerable to politicians’ year-to-year budget con-
straints and short term priorities, than more “rights-
based” tax credit schemes. Lack of stability in R&D 
grants is very unfortunate, as firms’ R&D investments 
are strategic and long term decisions with high 
adjustment costs. 
 
1.1. The Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme 
Introducing an R&D tax credit in Norway was proposed 
by the Hervik Commission in a green paper for the 
1. Introduction 
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Ministry of Trade and Industry (NOU 2000:7). The 
commission was appointed to suggest policy measures 
aimed at encouraging industry to invest more in R&D. 
The Norwegian Parliament had earlier in 2000 agreed 
to make increased R&D investments a national priority, 
and decided that R&D relative to GDP should at least 
reach the OECD average by 2005. This illustrates a 
general point. Generous R&D tax credit schemes are 
often introduced in countries where R&D investments 
are low by international standards, and where the 
sentiment is that “something needs to be done”.  
 
The Hervik commission suggested using an R&D tax 
credit as one of several policy tools to stimulate R&D 
investments. They emphasized that the R&D tax credit 
they proposed would be administratively simpler and 
more robust to informational problems than direct 
subsidies. It was intended to be the main policy tool 
towards small and medium sized firms (SMEs). In the 
commission’s opinion, the Norwegian Research Council 
should focus on R&D of strategic importance, and 
spend their resources initiating and evaluating large 
projects. It also emphasized that an R&D tax credit 
would give more stable conditions for the business 
community than direct subsidies. The total subsidy 
would not be subject to annual budget debates, and 
the detailed regulations would be embedded in the 
general tax code. Of course, the specifics of the 
scheme, such as deduction rates and rules on eligibility 
etc. could change over time, but it was a widely held 
view that it would be less vulnerable to “overnight” 
changes than direct subsidies 
 
The tax credit scheme, called SkatteFUNN, was intro-
duced in 2002.3 SkatteFUNN implies that firms can 
deduct from tax payable a certain amount of their R&D 
expenditures. Firms are entitled to the tax credit as 
long as the R&D-project has been approved by the 
Research Council of Norway, and the actual 
expenditures are approved by the tax authorities. 
 
Originally, only SMEs were eligible. SME were defined 
as firms fulfilling two out of the following three 
criteria: (i) Fewer than 100 employees (ii) an annual 
turnover less than 80 million NOK – about 10 million 
Euros (iii) an annual balance sheet total less than 40 
million NOK – about 5 million Euros.  
 
Already in 2003 large enterprises were included as 
well. Large enterprises may deduct from taxes owed 18 
percent of expenses related to an approved R&D 
project. 20 percent deduction is possible if the follow-
ing conditions for being a “small enterprise” are ful-
filled: (i) Fewer than 250 employees, (ii) an annual 
turnover not exceeding Euro 40 millions or an annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding Euro 27 millions and 
                                                     
3 The following description borrows from OECD (2007, p. 112), 
Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007, Appendix A) and 
http://web.skattefunn.no/index.php?kat=English 
(iii) less than 25 per cent of the company is owned by 
a large enterprise. This distinction between large and 
small enterprises follows EU/EEA state aid rules. The 
maximum allowable sum (i.e. the sum from which the 
tax deduction is calculated) for R&D projects 
conducted by the enterprise itself, is NOK 4 millions 
per year (about Euro 500 000). In cases where 
enterprises collaborate with an approved R&D 
institution (universities and institutes), the maximum 
sum is NOK 8 millions. Stimulating cooperation 
between academia and commerce is considered an 
important objective of the scheme. 
 
In order to qualify for the scheme, a project must be 
limited and focused, and it must be aimed at genera-
ting new knowledge, information or experience which 
is presumed to be of use for the enterprise in develop-
ing new or improved products, services or manufac-
turing/processing methods.  
 
There are no constraints or extra incentives based on 
sector or region. Enterprises that are not currently 
liable for taxation are also eligible. If the tax credit 
exceeds the tax payable by the firm, the difference is 
paid to the firm like a negative tax or a grant. If the 
firm is not in a tax position at all, the whole amount of 
the tax credit is paid to the firm as a grant. In practice 
this has turned out to be a very important feature, as 
around three-quarters of the total support given 
through the scheme is paid out as grants. The payment 
is made when the tax authorities have completed their 
tax assessment, and takes place the year after the 
actual R&D expenses have occurred. The R&D tax 
credit is thus neutral as between qualifying projects, 
regions, sectors and the tax position of qualifying 
firms, but lowers the marginal cost of R&D in small 
enterprises or low R&D spenders more than in larger 
ones. For firms that would have spent more on R&D 
than the maximum amount in the scheme even 
without the presence of the tax credit, the scheme 
gives no incentive on the margin to increase R&D 
investments, although they have a clear incentive to 
qualify for the scheme and receive the tax deduction.4 
 
As from the fiscal year 2007, a maximum hourly rate 
and a maximum number of hours per year for in-house 
R&D personnel has been introduced. The ceiling for 
payroll and indirect expenses has been set at NOK 500 
per hour (around 60 Euro). Up to 1850 hours per year 
may be approved per person associated with the 
project. This has made the scheme slightly less 
generous than in previous years.  
 
The Norwegian Parliament has decided to include 
financial support to unpaid labour in R&D activities in 
                                                     
4 In theory, the presence of liquidity constraints or internal political 
processes related to the investment budget could also give firms 
above the maximum amount an incentive to increase their R&D 
investments.   
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the tax credit scheme as well, in order to reach high 
tech entrepreneurs that do not draw wages from their 
firms. The amendment needs to be approved by the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA). A decision was 
expected in September 2007, but was not yet 
announced in late November 2007.  
 
The present report concerns the scheme’s ability to 
stimulate extra R&D effort in firms, and is an extension 
of Hægeland, Kjesbu and Møen (2006). The report 
uses data up to 2005, and is organized as follows. The 
next chapter gives an overview of the popularity of the 
scheme. In addition, we briefly report results from 
other relevant assessments of the scheme. Chapter 3 
gives a thorough discussion of our methodology, 
related to other strategies used in the literature. The 
data we use are described in chapter 4. Chapter 5 
presents some descriptive analyses, while the results 
from our econometric analyses are reported in chapter 
6. The final chapter concludes. 
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The Norwegian R&D tax credit has been very popular 
in the business community. This is perhaps not 
surprising – tax deductions usually are.  
 
2.1. Number of applications 
The number of applications received by the R&D tax 
credit secretariat has varied over time. In the first year, 
2002, there were 3300 applications. When the scheme 
was made universal in 2003 the number increased to 
4700 applications, but thereafter it has gradually 
fallen. In 2006 there were 2600 applications. About 30 
percent of the applications are either rejected or with-
drawn. Some of the applications are for projects that 
last for several years, and the number of “active pro-
jects” under the scheme has varied between 5000 and 
6000. The total R&D expenses under the scheme have 
also been fairly stable. The total budget for approved 
applications has been about 1.1 billion Euro per year. 
Around two thirds of the R&D expenses are personnel 
costs. 
 
2.2. Tax deductions 
In 2005, the total tax deduction was 135 million Euros. 
Out of this as much as 100 million Euros was paid out 
as a grant from the tax authorities to firms that were 
not in a tax position or would have paid less in taxes 
than their R&D tax relief. This illustrates that the 
scheme is particularly popular with small and newly 
established firms. Roughly 85 percent of all approved 
projects are undertaken by firms with less than 50 
employees. 50-60 percent of the applications are from 
firms with less than 10 employees. In 2005, these firms 
performed 45 percent of the total R&D expenses under 
the scheme. The high R&D activity in this segment is 
interesting, as the annual R&D statistics from Statistics 
Norway has not included firms with less than 10 
employees. This implies that we lack historical data for 
an important user group. Obviously, this complicates 
the evaluation.  
 
                                                     
5 See Cappelen et al. (2005, 2006 and 2007) for summaries of the 
research performed by the evaluation team in Statistics Norway. If 
no explicit reference is given, the figures in this subsection are 
collected from these reports. 
For all firms receiving subsidies through the R&D tax 
credit scheme, the average subsidy is about 1000 Euros 
per employee. Average tax per employee for the same 
firms in absence of the subsidy would have been 2300 
Euros. Hence, in these terms, the subsidy is rather 
substantial. 
 
2.3. Applicants 
13 percent of all manufacturing firms used the R&D 
tax credit in 2004, but only 1 percent in construction 
and most service sectors. Within the service sector, 
firms using the tax credit are concentrated in two 
industries, computing (NACE 72) and consulting 
(NACE 74.1-74.4).  
 
Cappelen et al (2007) report results from an analysis 
of the probability that a firm will apply for the R&D tax 
credit. Not surprisingly, they find that the share of 
highly educated employees is a very important 
predictor. They also find that young firms are over-
represented, and that firm size is important. Firms with 
50-100 or above 100 employees have the highest 
probability of applying for the tax credit, depending on 
the industry. Labour productivity is not significant. 
Interestingly, whether or not the firm is in position to 
pay a revenue tax seems to affect the decision to apply 
for SkatteFUNN. The scheme seems particularly 
attractive to firms that will receive the tax credit as a 
grant. 
 
2.4. OECD assessment 
In a recent survey, OECD (2007, p. 112) describes the 
Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme as rather generous 
by international standards. The OECD’s “B-index” 
calculations averaged about 22 percent in 2006. This is 
well above the OECD average and exceeded only by 
Canada, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Mexico and 
Spain. It should be noted, however, that the calcula-
tions do not take into account caps in tax deduction 
schemes. For Norway, therefore, the B-index applies to 
a firm not constrained by the cap in the SkatteFUNN 
scheme. Direct government funding of private R&D in 
2004 was 0.11 percent of GDP in Norway. This is close 
to the OECD average, but well above the median. 
 
2 Popularity and some preliminary 
assessments of the scheme5 
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The OECD survey makes some normative comments 
about the scheme: 
“The broadly neutral construction of the 
SkatteFUNN is a point in its favour, especially in 
Norway where there is a long tradition of including 
regional, social and sectoral goals in industrial 
policy. Of course, lower taxes on firms have to be 
compensated by higher taxes elsewhere. It is also 
possible that firms now claim tax credits against 
spending that they would not previously have 
classified as R&D. There is also the question of 
additionality, to what extent the tax credit 
generates genuine additional R&D that would not 
have taken place in its absence. The effectiveness of 
the SkatteFUNN in stimulating additional private 
R&D is currently under evaluation. It is relevant, 
although by no means conclusive, that the tax 
expenditure over the 2002-2004 period amounted 
to NOK 3.4 billion, equivalent to more than 400 
million, while recorded business R&D spending, 
which is erratic, did not rise. Preliminary data 
shows that nominal spending on private R&D 
recovered somewhat in 2005, but remained slightly 
below 2003 levels. Finally, there is the possibility 
that even if the tax credit stimulates genuine 
additional R&D, the tax expenditures could have 
been better used in other areas.” 
 
2.5. The preliminary report on input 
additionality 
A preliminary report on the input additionality issue 
was published as part of Statistics Norway’s evaluation 
project, cf. Hægeland, Kjesbu and Møen (2006). 
Among firms that previously have reported R&D 
investments, we found that firms receiving an R&D tax 
credit in 2003 had stronger growth in their R&D 
investments from 2001 to 2003 than firms not 
receiving an R&D tax credit in 2003. Obviously, this 
may be driven by selection into the scheme, and with 
the scheme being universal from its second year of 
existence, it is very challenging to construct a valid 
control group. Hægeland, Kjesbu and Møen (2006) 
suggested using the 8 million threshold as an 
identification strategy. They compared applicant firms 
that previously had invested less than NOK 8 million 
with applicant firms that previously had invested more 
than this threshold. Since R&D investments are fairly 
stable, the latter group should not have a strong 
incentive to increase their R&D investments because of 
the R&D tax credit. An increase in their R&D invest-
ments would not affect their total subsidy. Only firms 
that would invest less than the 8 million threshold in 
absence of the tax credit have their marginal R&D cost 
affected. Hægeland, Kjesbu and Møen (2006) found 
that firms that previously invested less than the 
threshold increase their R&D investments from 2001 to 
2003 more than firms that previously had investments 
above the threshold. They also found that firms that 
previously did not invest in R&D are more likely to 
start investing in R&D after the tax credit was intro-
duced, and firms that previously did invest in R&D are 
more likely to continue. 
 
2.6. Questionnaire surveys about input 
additionality 
The early econometric analysis of Hægeland, Kjesbu 
and Møen was complemented by a questionnaire 
survey. Foyn and Kjesbu (2006) reported that 22 
percent of firms with projects that were rejected 
completely abandoned their projects. 24 percent of the 
firms went through with the project without any 
changes. The remaining 54 percent were carried 
through, but at a smaller scale or with a delay. 30 
percent of firms with rejected projects agreed that 
SkatteFUNN has made them more focused on R&D. For 
firms that had their projects accepted, the question of 
additionality is more hypothetical. 15 percent say that 
the project would have been abandoned without the 
tax subsidy. 13 percent say the project would have 
been carried through without any changes. The 
remaining 72 percent say the project would have been 
carried out at a smaller scale or with a delay. A new 
survey was conducted in 2007, documented in Foyn 
(2007). The results are quite similar, but there is a 
tendency that firms report a somewhat smaller 
“additionality effect”, e.g. 19 percent say that the 
project would have been abandoned without the tax 
subsidy. The additionality appears to be larger for 
small firms 
 
Ljunggren, Brastad, Madsen and Alsos (2006) also 
conducted a survey on the input additionality in 
SkatteFUNN. Among applicant firms shortly after they 
submitted their application, 13 percent report that the 
project will be abandoned or postponed indefinitely if 
not supported. 18 percent report that they intend to go 
through with the project without any changes even if 
they do not receive support. The remaining 66 percent 
will be carried through, but at a smaller scale or with a 
delay. Ljunggren et al. do not find that input addition-
ality vary with firm age, but find a systematic pattern 
when comparing firms of different size. Additionality is 
larger for small firms than for large firms. 
 
The results in Foyn and Kjesbu (2006), Foyn (2007) 
and Ljunggren et al. (2006) are in line with each other 
and consistent with the preliminary econometric 
analysis described above. The questionnaire response is 
also in line with the results from similar questionnaires 
regarding direct R&D subsidies summarized in Klette 
and Møen (1998). The reported additionality in 
SkatteFUNN is, however, far below what Hervik, 
Bræin, Bremnes and Bergem (2006) find in surveys of 
firms that have received user-oriented direct R&D 
subsidies in the years 1997-2005. Hervik et al report 
that for the years 1997 to 2005, 45 percent of the firms 
say that their R&D project would have been abandoned 
without the R&D subsidy. 2 percent say the project 
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would have been carried through without any changes, 
and 52 percent say the project would have been 
carried out at a smaller scale or with a delay. Madsen 
and Brastad (2006) looking at firms that received 
support from Innovation Norway in 2002 find that 34 
percent of the firms report high input additionality.  
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3.1. Identifying the causal effect of 
SkatteFUNN 
In our main analysis, we use a fixed effects regression 
technique, as we will explain below. Here we discuss 
the fundamental problem of identifying the causal 
effect of SkatteFUNN and give a basic intuition for the 
econometric model that follows. Our approach – and 
its major weaknesses – can be illustrated by a simple 
two-group comparison of growth in R&D investments, 
so-called “difference-in-difference”. 
 
In order to identify the causal effect of SkatteFUNN, 
we must perform a counterfactual analysis. We must 
compare the actual level of R&D investments with the 
level of investment that would have been realized if the 
SkatteFUNN scheme had not been implemented. 
Ideally, the counterfactual investment level should be 
determined by a controlled experiment, randomly 
dividing the population of firms into two groups, 
giving one group access to the SkatteFUNN scheme. 
The effect of the credit could then be measured by the 
difference in response between the two groups. 
Obviously, this is not possible, and the challenge in a 
non-experimental setting is to deduct from historical 
data what the situation would have been if the tax 
incentive scheme had not been launched. In general, 
one does not have a guarantee that historical data can 
reveal what would have happened under a different 
policy regime.  
 
Unfortunately – from an evaluation perspective – all 
Norwegian firms have access to SkatteFUNN from 
2003 onwards. The first idea that springs to mind may 
be to compare those who choos to apply for the R&D 
tax credit with those who choose not to use the credit, 
but this will not mimic the golden standard of having 
two randomly selected groups. Those who choose to 
use the tax credit presumably see some profitable R&D 
investment opportunities, while those who choose not 
to use the scheme presumably do not see any profit-
able R&D investments opportunities. In this situation 
we cannot use the investment level of the firms that do 
not use the R&D tax credit to infer how much the firms 
that use the R&D tax credit would have invested in 
absence of the scheme.  
What we propose to exploit is a discontinuity built into 
the scheme. The R&D tax credit is limited to 
investments up to 4 million NOK in intramural R&D or 
8 million NOK in total R&D. Firms that would invest 
above this cap in absence of the R&D tax credit scheme 
will receive a subsidy, but increasing their R&D 
investments will not increase the subsidy as they are 
already above the maximum possible subsidy. Hence, 
they do not receive any subsidies on their marginal 
investments.6 Firms that would invest less than the cap 
in absence of the scheme will, on the other hand, have 
an incentive to increase their R&D investments as this 
will increase their subsidy. They receive an 18-20 
percent subsidy on each extra krone they invest in R&D 
up to the cap. One may conceive that whether a firm’s 
investment level in absence of the R&D tax credit 
scheme will be above or below the cap is somewhat 
random. Our main identification strategy is therefore 
to compare the two groups and assume that the 
difference in R&D growth between the groups is 
because one of the groups receives a tax credit for their 
marginal R&D investment. Stated differently, we 
assume that firms’ growth in R&D investments is not 
systematically related to whether they would invest 
above or below the cap in absence of SkatteFUNN. This 
is not an innocuous assumption. It is not obvious that 
firms with small and large R&D investments have the 
same expected growth rate in absence of the scheme. 
Moreover, difference in measured growth rates will be 
influenced by “regression-to-the-mean” to the extent 
that firms’ R&D investments tend to deviate temporary-
ly from a typical level. Firms that had an “unusually” 
high R&D investment level in the pre SkatteFUNN 
period will tend to be classified above the cap and at 
the same time they will be expected to reduce their 
R&D investment level. Firms that had an “unusually” 
                                                     
6 If firms are liquidity constrained, there could be a positive effect 
also on firms above the cap. Moreover, firms that would do more 
than 4 million in intramural R&D but less than 8 million in total R&D 
may have an incentive to substitute intramural R&D for extramural 
R&D. We abstract from this. With respect to liquidity constraint, we 
have experimented with including cash flow as a control variable in 
our main regressions, but somewhat surprisingly, we did not find any 
evidence suggesting that R&D investments were sensitive to the 
firms’ cash flow. 
3. Methodology 
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low R&D investment level in the pre SkatteFUNN 
period will tend to be classified below the cap and at 
the same time they will be expected to increase their 
R&D investment level.  
 
Before we can compare R&D growth between firms 
that would invest above or below the cap in absence of 
the scheme, we need to determine which firm belongs 
to which group. This is a challenge. After all, how 
much the firms would invest in absence of the scheme 
is the question we try to answer. A simple approach is 
to divide the sample into two groups based on their 
average level of R&D-investments before the intro-
duction of SkatteFUNN. Firm- level R&D investments 
are known to be fairly stable over time, cf. Klette and 
Johansen (1998), so the majority of firms that invested 
less than the cap before the SkatteFUNN scheme was 
introduced, would likely continue to invest less than 
the cap in absence of the scheme, and vice versa. 
Predicting future R&D based on pre SkatteFUNN 
average R&D will be less vulnerable to a regression-to-
the-mean-bias than an approach using only the most 
recent R&D observation. However, the closer a firm’s 
historical R&D investments are to the cap, the more 
uncertain the classification. Mixing up the two groups 
will cause the measured difference to be smaller than 
the true difference. To the extent that average R&D put 
too little emphasis on the most recent R&D 
observation, this will add to the contamination of the 
treatment and control groups.  
 
When using a “discontinuity approach” to evaluate 
effects, one usually tries to secure comparability of the 
two groups by narrowing the sample down to firms 
right above and right below the point of discontinuity 
or cap in the scheme. In our case this implies a very 
unpleasant trade-off. Not only does it cause a costly 
loss of observations, but the more we narrow down the 
sample in order to improve the comparability of the 
two groups, the more likely it is that firms are mis-
classified. The choice we make in our main analysis is 
to restrict the sample to firms that are observed with 
positive R&D investments in at least one year prior to 
the introduction of SkatteFUNN and that never are 
observed with investments above 40 million NOK in a 
single year. Hence all firms in the sample are R&D 
performers, and the largest R&D performers are 
excluded. This way we hope to enhance comparability 
while retaining a fairly large sample with the majority 
of firms being clearly above or below the cap. 
 
Excluding firms that have not previously reported R&D 
is unfortunate from an evaluation point of view. The 
scheme aims to incur such firms to start investing in 
R&D. However, we choose to investigate the 
probability of starting to invest in R&D in a separate 
analysis since the decision to invest in R&D for the first 
time may be rather different from the decision to 
change the level of R&D investments. 
Table 3.1. Growth in R&D for firms with and without a tax 
subsidy on the margin 
Average pre 2002 intramural 
R&D investments 
Growth in real 
intramural R&D from 
2001 to 2003 Below 4 mill. Above 4 mill. 
Difference1 
10th percentile -2 -1.59 -0.41 
Median 0 -0.10 0.10 
90th percentile 2 0.76 1.24 
Average -0.08 -0.22 0.14 
Standard error 1.19 0.89  
Average pre 2002 
intramural R&D 
948 000 9 489 000  
N 687 230  
1 The difference between the two distributions is significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
In table 3.1. we report descriptive statistics on growth 
in real intramural R&D from 2001 to 2003 for firms in 
the sample that were present in both surveys and 
received a tax credit in 2003. In line with the 
identification strategy suggested, we split the sample in 
two groups and compare firms with average R&D 
investments prior to SkatteFUNN above and below the 
4 million cap. Only firms observed with positive R&D 
investments in some year prior to SkatteFUNN are 
included. R&D growth is calculated as  
 
(R&D 2003 – R&D 2001)/(0,5* R&D 2001+0,5* R&D 2003) 
 
in order to reduce the influence of outliers and to allow 
including firms with zero R&D in 2003. Measuring 
growth by log differences gives very similar results to 
the ones reported below. The significance tests and 
median difference between the groups is almost exactly 
the same while the standard deviations and average 
difference are larger. 
 
We see that the group that used to invested less than 4 
million NOK in R&D prior to SkatteFUNN on average 
had 14 percentage points higher growth rate from 
2001 to 2003 as compared to the group that invested 
more than 4 million NOK in R&D in 2001. A two 
sample mean comparison t-test with unequal variance 
gives a p-value close to zero. The non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney two sample rank-sum test also gives a 
p-value close to zero. Hence the difference between the 
two groups is statistically very significant. The results 
in table 3.1 therefore suggest that the Norwegian R&D 
tax credit scheme do stimulate additional R&D. Before 
jumping to conclusions, however, one should note that 
the number of observations available for the analysis is 
low compared to the number of firms using the scheme 
and the average level of intramural R&D prior to 2002 
differs markedly between the two groups. This is a 
reminder of the prior caveats, and that it may be 
difficult to reach a strong conclusion given the 
available data and the design of the scheme. In 
particular, we cannot distinguish between the effect of 
SkatteFUNN and other possible changes in the macro 
environment that affect small and large R&D 
performers differently. Furthermore, leaving out firms 
that reported no R&D in 2001 makes the difference 
Reports 2007/47 Input additionality in the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme 
  17 
between the two groups smaller and insignificant. 
Hence, the positive effect seems to be driven by firms 
that did very little R&D prior to SkatteFUNN. 
 
In our main analysis the, two-group comparison is 
embedded in a regression analysis. This has several 
advantages. First, we can include control variables. 
This will make the two groups more comparable, and 
also improve the precision of statistical tests by 
reducing the unexplained variance. Second, we can 
utilize all observations of the firms, not only one year 
prior to SkatteFUNN and one year after. This will give 
us a more precise estimate of the change caused by 
SkatteFUNN for the firms used in the above analysis, 
and also make it possible to include firms that were 
missing from one or both of the surveys in 2001 and 
2003. Finally, within a regression framework we can 
answer more specific questions such as whether long 
term effects differ from short term effects, and whether 
certain firm characteristics are associated with 
particularly high or low additionality. However, the 
fundamental identification problem described above 
still remains. 
 
Before developing the regression framework in detail, 
we will review different approaches used to analyze 
additionality in R&D tax credit schemes in the previous 
literature. 
 
3.2. Identification strategies in the previous 
literature  
We are to answer an apparently simple question: Has 
SkatteFUNN led to increased R&D investments? We 
“know” from our data, what the situation was before 
the scheme was introduced. We also know what the 
situation is now in the presence of the scheme. How-
ever, finding the causal effect implies answering the 
counterfactual question: What would the situation 
have been now in the absence of the scheme? The 
methods briefly described below are in principle suited 
to do so, given that certain assumptions are not 
violated. The most important assumption is that firms’ 
access to the scheme, or variations in generosity of the 
scheme over time and between firms are not related to 
factors which cannot be controlled for in the analysis, 
that are themselves related to the level of R&D 
investments. I.e., there must be some randomness in 
treatment. However, such variation may be rare, or in 
some cases even absent. 
 
Not all “other factors” related to R&D investments 
cause problems. Many of them are directly observable 
and can be controlled for in the analysis. Estimating 
econometric equations in differenced form or using 
panel data techniques may also control for unobserved 
differences between firms that are constant over time. 
The main problem arises when firms’ access to or use 
of the scheme are correlated with unobserved factors 
which vary over time. This point makes it particularly 
problematic to look at firms who apply for support 
through the scheme, using those firms that do not 
apply as a comparison group. Firms that get a good 
research idea are more likely to apply for support 
through the scheme, but they would also be more 
likely to carry out the project in the absence of the 
support. Hence, firms “within” the scheme and outside 
the scheme are likely to differ with respect to “research 
ideas”, an unobservable and time-varying variable. 
 
Ideally, the question of whether a specific measure 
works or not should be answered by carrying out a 
controlled experiment, randomly dividing the popula-
tion of firms into two groups, giving one group access 
to the scheme. This would provide us with the exo-
genous variation we need, and we can compare a 
treatment group with a control group using the above 
framework. This ideal situation is almost never 
feasible, cf. Jaffe (2002). 
 
Schemes and measures are often general in nature. 
This creates great challenges for evaluators. The more 
general the scheme, i.e. the more equally similar firms 
are treated in the scheme, the more complicated is the 
evaluation. The reason is that a higher degree of 
“generality” or “equal treatment” brings us further 
away from the ideal evaluation setting. When all 
comparable firms either have access to the scheme or 
not, it is impossible to construct a control group telling 
us anything about the counterfactual situation.  
 
The challenge in a non-experimental setting, without a 
formal control group, is to deduct from historical data, 
what the situation would have been if scheme had not 
been launched. In the absence of a controlled experi-
ment, one needs to look for so-called quasi-experi-
ments built into the scheme. A quasi-experiment is e.g. 
variations in the scheme that may be regarded as 
“random” at least on the margin. In our setting, 
randomness implies that the variations are not 
systematically related to (unobserved) variables that 
affect firm’s R&D decisions. A potential quasi-
experiment would be variations in the generosity of the 
scheme with respect to firm characteristics that are 
relatively fixed in the short term, e.g. number of 
employees. Assuming that firms around the border of 
the size restriction are comparable, and that it is in a 
sense random whether they were eligible for support 
through the scheme or not, this discontinuity creates a 
quasi-experiment, and one may study the effect by 
comparing firms just above and just below the 
threshold.  
 
The most authoritative survey on the effects of tax 
incentives on R&D investments is Hall and van Reenen 
(2000). In this section, we focus on the methods that 
are described in their article, and do not discuss their 
empirical results in detail. The main conclusion in this 
respect is that one dollar in R&D support given through 
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tax incentives seems to give one dollar in increased 
R&D investments, i.e. that companies use the support 
given – no more and no less – to increase their R&D. 
They emphasize that there is substantial uncertainty 
with respect to this estimate, and they have critical 
remarks to the methodological approach taken by 
many of the studies they review.  
 
Hall and van Reenen (2000) group the literature into 
five different frameworks and the exposition below 
borrows heavily from their work. 
1. Event studies 
2. Case studies 
3. R&D demand equation with shift parameter for 
existence of a tax credit scheme  
4. Demand equation with user cost of R&D 
5. Structural estimation of R&D investments 
 
Below, we explain each of these, and discuss strengths 
and weaknesses in relation to evaluating the 
Norwegian scheme. 
 
Event studies 
Event studies will typically consider the launching of 
the fiscal measure as a sudden and surprising event for 
firms. Under this assumption, one can measure effects 
of the scheme by doing before-after comparisons. The 
most common outcome variable used in event studies 
is the market value of firms, thereby measuring how 
the stock market estimates the value of the scheme in 
terms of returns that accrue to firms. This is probably 
not an adequate evaluation method for the Norwegian 
SkatteFUNN scheme. First, the scheme was not 
launched as a sudden event, but was the result of a 
long debate, and announced in advance. This may 
have created expectations that have affected the 
valuation of firms. Second, the method is relevant only 
for publicly traded firms, where information on market 
value is readily available. Third, the change in the 
private valuation of firms will tell us little about the 
social returns to the scheme, and hardly anything 
about to which extent the scheme stimulates R&D 
investments. One possibility is to do event studies with 
R&D investments as the outcome variable. In such 
studies, R&D investments after the scheme is launched 
are compared to the investment level that was planned 
before the fiscal measure was announced. Several 
countries gather such information in their R&D 
surveys. In Norway, firms are asked about their 
planned level of R&D investments one and two years 
ahead. In principle, therefore, one can compare what 
companies in 2001 planned for 2003 with their actual 
R&D investments in 2003. But it is problematic to 
assume that SkatteFUNN came as a surprise after the 
R&D survey for 2001 was carried out in the spring of 
2002.  
 
Though the methodology used in event studies is 
intuitively appealing, it has its weaknesses. The most 
obvious weakness is that it is difficult to control for the 
effects on the outcome variable of other events or 
trends that appear simultaneously with the event one 
focuses on. In our setting, there may be other reasons 
for deviations between planned and actual R&D than 
the introduction of the fiscal measure. Event studies 
are most suitable to study sudden events where effects 
materialize quickly. Neither of these criteria is likely to 
be fulfilled in the case of fiscal measures for R&D, and 
certainly not in the case of SkatteFUNN.  
 
Case studies/questionnaire surveys 
Hall and van Reenen (2000) consider case studies as 
“retrospective event studies”. The method is 
straightforward. Involved actors are asked whether the 
launching of a fiscal measure had any effect on 
variables and factors that are of interest to the 
evaluator, e.g. R&D investments. The major advantage 
of this approach is that respondents implicitly control 
for other external conditions when they answer the 
questions. Another advantage is that case studies and 
surveys may capture more qualitative effects, which 
may not be easily identifiable through other data 
sources.  
 
Case studies and surveys are very useful, and should 
probably constitute an important part of any thorough 
evaluation. However, they do have shortcomings, and 
should be supplemented by other methods, as is also 
the case in the Norwegian evaluation of SkatteFUNN. 
As Hall and van Reenen point out, respondents may 
have the incentive to answer strategically. If they feel 
that their response may have importance for the 
continuation of the scheme, they may adjust their 
answer accordingly. E.g., if they think that a finding of 
a large input additionality increases the probability 
that the scheme is continued; they may exaggerate the 
effect on R&D investments. Even if the respondents do 
not answer strategically, it is far from obvious that they 
are able to isolate the effect of the fiscal measure from 
other factors. This may not be a problem if the error is 
not systematically related to the real effects of the 
fiscal measure. However, this may not be the case. For 
example, there might a tendency that managers with 
positive results overestimate the effects of their own 
effort, while those with negative results exaggerate the 
impact of external factors. 
 
R&D demand equation with shift parameter 
for existence of a tax credit scheme  
This approach is used in a large number of studies. The 
point of departure is a regression equation that 
predicts R&D investments at the firm level, including a 
variable that indicates whether the firm had access to 
the tax credit, in addition to other variables that affect 
R&D investments. 
 
(3.1) ititit uxCDR +′++= γβα)&ln(  
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This equation expresses the logarithm of the R&D 
investments of firm i in year t as a function of the 
presence of a fiscal measure (Cit equals one if firm i had 
access to the scheme in year t and zero otherwise) and 
other variables, which are contained in the vector xit. 
Such variables may be previous R&D investments, 
previous output, expected future output, cash flow, 
product prices etc.  
 
The β-parameter measures the expected growth of 
R&D-investments following a firm getting access to the 
scheme. The basic framework assumes that this effect 
is identical across firms. This assumption is hardly 
innocuous, but it is not discussed by Hall and van 
Reenen. Such models should be estimated on micro 
data, to utilize cross-section variations in access to the 
scheme across firms. Using macro data only, it is 
impossible to distinguish the effects of the scheme from 
unobserved macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Demand equation with user cost of R&D 
This approach has very much in common with the one 
described above. The major difference is that instead of 
just including a variable indicating existence of or 
access to a fiscal measure for R&D, one calculates the 
so-called “user cost” of R&D investments, i.e. a variable 
 that reflects the price of R&D investments for the 
firm, on the margin, taking into account R&D fiscal 
measures, other tax rules, interest rates and 
depreciation. The introduction of say a tax deduction 
scheme for R&D will reduce the user cost of R&D. 
 
(3.2) ititit uxDR +′++= γβρα)&ln(  
 
The key advantage of the user cost approach compared 
to the shift paramter approach is that one may utilize 
variations in the generosity of the scheme across firms, 
and also changes over time. Such variation may be 
very useful in identifying the effect of the scheme. In 
addition, variations in other components of the user 
cost (tax rules, interest rates, depreciation rates) may 
in theory help in identifying the effects of the fiscal 
measure. 
 
Within this framework, one may calculate the price 
elasticity of R&D, that is, how large the percentage 
change of R&D investments that follows from a one 
percentage change in the user cost. 
 
The user cost is calculated by calculating what it costs 
for a profit- maximizing firm to invest “an additional 
dollar” in R&D at time t, and then “sell” this project in 
the next period. The tax system affects this cost in two 
respects. First, the return to the investment is taxed at 
a rate τt. Second, the investment cost, is reduced by the 
tax subsidy and the allowed tax depreciation. Let Adit 
denote the present value of this depreciation, and Acit 
be the present value of the tax subsidy. The user cost 
may then be expressed by 
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Until quite recently, Norwegian firms have been 
allowed to write off R&D investments immediately. 
This implies that Adit= τt. Under the SkatteFUNN 
scheme, Norwegian firms get tax deductions for 
intramural R&D investments up to 4 million NOK, (8 
million when including extramural R&D bought from 
approved research institutions.) Looking at intramural 
R&D we then have Acit= τ
c
t if R&Dit<4 millions and 
Acit= 0 if R&Dit ≥ 4 millions. rt is the interest rate, and 
δi is the private depreciation rate for R&D investments. 
 
It is typically ln( it) that enters the demand equation. 
Then the user cost is separable in a tax component and 
a component that varies with the interest rate and the 
depreciation rate. With Norwegian tax rules, the tax 
component of the user cost becomes 
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lnln  where D= 0 if R&Dit ≥  
4 millions or t<2002 
 
and 
 
D=1 if R&Dit<4 millions and t ≥ 2003 or  
R&Dit<4 millions and t=2002 and the firm is an SME. 
 
 
We then have  
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Here we have abstracted from the small variation in τct 
between SMEs (20 percent) and large firms (18 
percent) after 2002. It is of course easy to incorporate 
this into our framework, but it contributes so little to 
variation in the user cost that it will hardly have any 
practical consequences for the identification. In 
principle, an advantage of employing a user cost 
approach is that the interest- and depreciation 
component of the user cost may be calculated, and 
may vary, also in the period prior to the introduction in 
the scheme. Such variation will help identification. In 
practice, however, this component will be imprecisely 
measured and only vary across time. Even in the time 
dimension, the variation will usually be modest. Hall 
and van Reenen state that estimates based on this 
variation may be of limited reliability, and strongly 
dependent on which other control variables are 
included in the regression model.  
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Looking at the expressions for the tax component of 
the user cost deducted above using the Norwegian 
SkatteFUNN scheme, two things are worth noting. 
First, the user cost takes on only two values. In other 
words, there is little difference between using a 
dummy variable indicating whether a firm has access 
to SkatteFUNN and calculating a user cost. Our point 
of departure will therefore be the more simple 
approach by estimating a shift parameter. Second, the 
cross-section variation in the user cost is endogenous, 
since the price of R&D depends directly on the level of 
R&D investments in year t via the indicator variable D. 
At the same time, the level of R&D investments is the 
dependent variable in the analysis, i.e. what we are 
attempting to measure the effect on. A consistent 
estimate of β then depends on the existence of valid 
instrumental variables, i.e. variables that help us 
predict whether the firm will be above or below 4 
millions in R&D investments, but have no additional 
effects on R&D investments. It is obvious that finding 
such a variable is very difficult, and this endogeneity 
problem therefore poses a fundamental challenge in 
the evaluation.  
 
The theoretical foundation for the demand equations 
sketched above is poorly developed, and some 
researchers have called for a more structural approach. 
As Hall and van Reenen state, this is easier said than 
done. Empirical testing of structural models of 
investment in physical capital has yielded 
disappointing results. Modelling investments in R&D is 
even more demanding, because of the high degree of 
idiosyncratic risk and substantial capital market 
imperfections. In empirical work, it is also far more 
difficult to calculate the stock of R&D capital than to 
calculate the stock of physical capital. However, Hall 
and van Reenen formulate a simple structural model 
that may motivate the demand equations of the user 
cost type described above. This model yields the 
following equation to be estimated: 
 
(3.3) itiitit uoutputDR ++++= ηγβρα )ln()&ln(  
 
One of the assumptions of behind this equation is that 
the R&D investments in each firm have an 
approximately constant growth rate. We see that the x 
vector of control variables now only contains the log of 
output (sales). Furthermore, a firm-specific error 
component is included.  
 
One problem that this model does not take into 
account is that there may be substantial adjustment 
costs for a firm associated with changing its R&D 
investments. In empirical specifications, this is often 
incorporated by including R&D in the previous period 
as an explanatory variable. Typically the estimated 
coefficient on this variable is large, reflecting the 
stability in firms’ R&D investment. Temporary shocks 
will only affect the level of investment to a limited 
extent, and it may take relatively long time before the 
full effect of even permanent shocks is observed. This 
problem is related to the fact that there are large fixed 
costs associated with having an ongoing R&D activity, 
e.g. having an own R&D department within a firm, and 
that R&D investments to a large extent are sunk costs. 
According to Hall and van Reenen, this casts doubts on 
how well the linear specifications above approximate 
the real world. As a minimum, they suggest that the 
decision to become an R&D-investing firm is modelled 
separately from the decision on how much to invest in 
R&D, conditional on having built up R&D competence. 
 
3.3. How our identification strategy relates to 
the previous literature 
We will use the semi-structural equation (3.3) above as 
point of departure for our econometric model. As 
explained in section 3.2.4, however, the user price 
basically takes on two values under the Norwegian 
scheme. Therefore, we will exchange the user price for 
a dummy variable being one if a firm is predicted to be 
eligible for a tax credit on their marginal R&D 
investment.  
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General firm information is collected from numerous 
sources available in Statistics Norway and covers the 
entire population of Norwegian firms: Structural 
statistics, accounts statistic, the tax register, the 
register of employers and employees and the national 
education database. 
 
Information related to R&D investments and R&D 
subsidies are not available for the entire population of 
firms. Prior to the introduction of SkatteFUNN, 
information on firm level R&D investments are 
available from the R&D surveys collected every second 
year by Statistics Norway up to 2001 and annually 
thereafter. All firms with more than 50 employees are 
included, and a stratified sample of firms with 10-50 
employees. In 2003 a survey was also conducted on 
firms with less than 10 employees. We use surveys 
from 1993 onwards. 
 
After the introduction of SkatteFUNN, R&D 
information has also been collected by the Research 
Council of Norway among the SkatteFUNN applicants. 
Some of this information covers the years before the 
firms apply for support and before the scheme was 
introduced. 
 
There are 17 290 firm year observations in the R&D 
surveys in the years 1993-2001, i.e. prior to 
SkatteFUNN. 26 % of these report positive R&D 
(intramural, extramural or both). After the 
introduction of SkatteFUNN, in the years 2002-2005, 
there are 16 464 firm year observations. Out of these 
33 % report positive R&D and 20 %, 3249 firm year 
observations, have applied for an R&D tax credit. The 
3249 firm year observations that applied for a tax 
credit within the R&D surveys constitute only 24 % of 
the 13 884 firm year R&D tax credit applications in the 
years 2002 to 2005. Of these 13 884 applications, 11 
144, i.e. 80 %, received a tax credit.  
 
Table 4.1 split firm-year observations that either have 
received an R&D tax credit or have been included in an 
R&D survey on employment groups. As one can easily 
see, firms in the R&D surveys are not a representative 
sample of the SkatteFUNN firms. The SkattteFUNN 
data base is dominated by very small firms while the 
R&D surveys are dominated by medium sized firms. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Firm year observations 2002-2005 by data base and number of employees 
Included in the SkatteFUNN database Yes Yes Yes  No No 
Included in the R&D survey  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Positive R&D     Yes No 
No or missing employees 2158 2158 0 1 0 1 
1-9 employees 5786 5700 86 537 62 389 
10-19 employees 2065 1371 694 5204 464 4046 
20-49 employees 2030 1135 895 3927 496 2536 
50-99 employees 952 194 758 2885 548 1579 
100-199 employees 415 31 384 2025 462 1179 
200 or more employees 478 46 432 1885 556 887 
Total 13884 10635 3249 16464 2598 10617 
 
 
4. Data 
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There are 2598 firm -year observations from 2002 
onwards that report positive R&D without having 
applied for a tax credit7. This is 47 % of the firms in the 
R&D surveys with positive R&D. The median R&D for 
firms with positive R&D that do not apply is only half 
of the median R&D for firms with positive R&D that do 
apply. However, average R&D for the two groups is 
about the same, as some of the firms that do not apply 
are very large R&D performers. That the group of non-
applicants contains both very small and very large R&D 
performers seems natural.  
 
There are 254 firm-year observations with a positive 
R&D tax credit that report no R&D in the R&D surveys. 
This suggests that zeros in the R&D surveys are not 
entirely reliable. Some firms may claim to do no R&D 
as a way to minimize time spent on the survey, and 
there may be errors in the processing of the data. 
 
Out of the 11 144 firm year observations with a 
positive R&D tax credit, 70 % had all of the tax credit 
associated with intramural R&D, and 1 % had all of the 
tax credit associated with extramural R&D. Hence, 29 
% had a tax credit associated with both intramural and 
extramural R&D. 18 % reached the tax credit cap for 
intramural R&D and 0.5 % reached the cap for total 
R&D. 8 
 
See Hægeland et al (2006), Kjesbu (2006) and 
Cappelen et al (2007, Appendix B) for more detailed 
information about the various sources and variables. 
Cappelen et al (2007) is written in English, the others 
in Norwegian. 
                                                     
7 Note that large firms in 2002 were not eligible, but adjusting for 
this does not change the numbers below much. 
8 There are 877 firm-year observations in the R&D surveys that have 
reached the cap for intramural R&D. 261 of these actually report less 
than 4 million in intramural R&D, and 194 report less than 3 million. 
This illustrate that for some firms, the “formula” for calculating R&D 
costs in the SkatteFUNN application is rather generous. There are no 
incidences in the R&D surveys of firms reaching the cap for total 
R&D and reporting less than 8 million in total R&D. Note also that 
there are 300 firm-year observations in the R&D surveys of firms that 
get a tax credit and report more than 4 million in intramural R&D 
without reaching the tax credit cap. 207 of these report more than 5 
million in intramural R&D. 
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5.1. Do R&D expenditures in the R&D surveys 
match R&D expenditures reported in 
SkatteFUNN-data? 
In our econometric analyses, we utilize data from both 
the R&D surveys and from the SkatteFUNN database. It 
is interesting to know whether firms report similar 
figures in these two data sources. Since there is a cap 
on project size in the tax credit scheme, there is no 
reason for firms with total R&D above the cap to apply 
for a tax credit for all their projects. We therefore 
restrict attention to firms that report less than 4 million 
intramural R&D in the R&D surveys. Since some 
applications to SkatteFUNN are rejected or withdrawn, 
and some approved projects are never started, we also 
restrict the sample to firms that received a tax credit.  
 
Table 5.1 shows that figures in the R&D survey and the 
SkatteFUNN application are of similar magnitude, but 
budgeted costs in the SkatteFUNN applications tend to 
be larger. This could indicate that costs are exagger-
ated, or at least that the cost formula used for the tax 
credit calculations is somewhat generous compared to 
what counts as R&D in the R&D statistics. Having a 
scheme that allows R&D projects to include more 
overhead costs than what one chooses to classified as 
R&D in the R&D statistics is, however, not a problem 
as long as the formula used to calculate the overhead is 
not out of proportion generous and easy to manipulate. 
Evaluated at the median, the application budget in 
SkatteFUNN is 21 % larger than R&D reported in the 
R&D survey. Evaluated at the mean, the application 
budget is 34 % larger than R&D reported in the R&D 
surveys. Some of this difference may be due to the 
project being scaled down by the firm after the 
application is submitted. Evaluated at the mean, the 
actual R&D costs accepted for the tax credit is 6 % 
lower than the budget, but this is nonetheless 25 % 
more than what is reported in the R&D surveys. 
Evaluated at the median, the actual R&D costs 
accepted for the tax credit is 9 % lower than the 
budget, and 9 % more than what is reported in the 
R&D surveys.  
 
The comparability of numbers in the R&D survey and 
SkatteFUNN data base is of particular importance 
around the cap as the difference between firms above 
and below the cap is central to out identification 
strategy. When redoing the analysis behind table 5.1 
for firms with intramural R&D between 3 and 4 million 
we find that the numbers are very close to each other 
for this group which consists of 248 observations. 
Median intramural R&D is 3561. Median intramural 
R&D in the SkatteFUNN application is 3580 and 
median intramural R&D accepted for the tax credit is 
3545. Mean values are 3547, 3460 and 3522, 
respectively. Based on this it seems acceptable to 
distinguish firms above and below the cap according to 
R&D as reported in the R&D surveys. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Comparing R&D costs in the SkatteFUNN application and the R&D surveys for firms with less than 4 million intramural 
R&D 
 R&D survey SkatteFUNN application N 
 Median Mean Median Mean  
Total Intramural R&D 1654 1759 2000 2358 1578 
Personnel costs 1049 1270 1397 1696 1578 
Scientific equipment1 0 139 0 132 1578 
Other operational costs 198 344 251 530 1578 
Extamural R&D2 0 382 0 283 1578 
1 The 75th percentile is 200 in the R&D surveys and 120 in the tax credit applications. 
2 The 90th percentile is 500 in the R&D surveys and 651 in the tax credit applications. 
Numbers are in million 2003 NOK. The sample consists of firm year observations with less than 4 million intramural R&D in the R&D surveys and that received an R&D 
tax credit. 
 
5. Descriptive analyses
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Figure 5.1. Estimated distributions of intramural R&D 
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Figure 5.2. Estimated distributions of R&D personnel costs 
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Figure 5.1 graphs the distribution of total intramural 
R&D in the R&D surveys and in the tax credit database 
restricting the sample to firms that report positive 
values below 5 million NOK in both sources. Again, we 
see that the two sources correspond, but numbers in 
the R&D tax credit database are slightly larger with a 
hump around the 4 million cap. 
 
Personnel costs, including indirect costs, in the 
SkatteFUNN applications are of particular interest as 
they are estimated based on a formula rather than 
being based on true wage costs as in the R&D surveys. 
Personnel- and indirect costs are based on hours 
worked on the project by the firms’ employees multi-
plied with a hourly cost set to 0,0016 of the employees 
annual contracted wage. With 1950 hours in a 
standard man year, this implies that personnel- and 
indirect costs for one man-year will be 3,2 times 
annual wage. This is to cover wage, social insurance, 
housing rent, office support etc. One would expect this 
to be larger than the R&D wage bill reported in the 
R&D survey even though this also includes social 
insurance and may include some support personnel. 
Figure 5.2 give estimated distributions of the same 
type as Figure 5.1.  
Table 5.2. The ratio of personnel costs in the SkatteFUNN 
application to personnel costs in the R&D surveys 
for firms with less than 4 million intramural R&D 
Intramural R&D in mill 
2003 NOK 
Median Mean St. dev N 
All firms, 0-4 1.19 1.74 2.03 1577 
0-0,5 1.65 3.00 4.13 221 
0,5-1 1.29 1.85 1.51 298 
1-2 1.25 1.67 1.52 433 
2-3 1.13 1.36 0.99 377 
3-4 1.00 1.20 0.99 248 
Numbers are in million 2003 NOK. The sample consists of firm year observations 
with less than 4 million intramural R&D in the R&D surveys and that received an 
R&D tax credit. 
 
Similar to table 5.1. we see that the distribution of 
personnel costs in the application is somewhat shifted to 
the right compared with the distribution of personnel 
costs in the R&D surveys. This again is consistent with 
the formula used in the application being somewhat 
generous. In order to study this in more detail, we 
construct for each firm the ratio of tax credit application 
personnel costs to R&D survey personnel costs. Table 
5.2 give the ratio of personnel costs in the SkatteFUNN 
application and the R&D surveys by total intramural 
R&D reported in the R&D surveys.  
 
For the full sample we see that the median of the ratios 
is 1.19. There is, however, substantial variation, and 
some large outliers with a very high ratio. The max 
value is 37.5 and the min value is 0.9 The mean value 
is 1.74 and the standard deviation is 2.03.  
 
Looking at the ratio by the size of total intramural R&D 
as reported in the R&D surveys, we see that both the 
ratio itself and the variance of the ratio fall systematic-
cally by the size of the R&D budget. For firms close to 
the cap, the median ratio is exactly one. The mean 
value is 1.2 and the standard deviation is 0.99. A 
standard deviation close to one shows that even in this 
group, there is large heterogeneity.  
 
Figure 5.3 plots the ratio of personnel costs in the 
SkatteFUNN application and the R&D surveys against 
the firms’ reported R&D man-years in the R&D survey. 
 
This illustrates clearly how extreme indirect costs are 
associated with small R&D performers. Plotting the 
same ratios against the firms’ number of employees in 
figure 5.4 reveals that small R&D performers 
“exploiting” the formula are not necessarily small firms.  
 
Given the generous overhead implicit in the calculation 
of indirect costs, it is also interesting to note that 
“other operational costs” are quite a bit larger in the 
SkatteFUNN application than in the R&D surveys. 
                                                     
9 The fact that many firms have a ratio smaller than one may suggest 
that even among firms that do less than 4 million intramural R&D, 
there are projects that are not submitted to SkatteFUNN. This is 
puzzling, and it may also conceal overreporting on projects sub-
mitted, as these “low ratio firms” reduce the median and average 
numbers in table 5.1 and 5.2. 
Reports 2007/47 Input additionality in the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme 
  25 
Figure 5.3. The ratio of personnel costs in the SkatteFUNN 
application and the R&D surveys by R&D man-
years1 
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1 One outlier observation with ratio equal to 37.5 is excluded from the plot. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. The ratio of personnel costs in the SkatteFUNN 
application and the R&D surveys by total employment1 
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1 One outlying observation with ratio equal to 37.5 is excluded from the plot. 
 
 
 
5.2. R&D tax credits reported in the R&D 
surveys 
Starting with the R&D survey for 2002, firms have 
been asked to report the R&D tax credit alongside 
other R&D subsidies used to finance their R&D invest-
ments. The surveys are conducted in the year after the 
investment year, and firms should have sufficient 
information to answer the question. The figures 
reported in the R&D surveys seem quite unreliable, 
however. Only half of the firms receiving an R&D tax 
credit report this in the R&D surveys. Among those 
who report such support, only about 30% report 
numbers that deviate less than 10 000 NOK, from the 
true numbers, and there is a slight tendency to 
underreport. Some firms clearly report numbers for the 
wrong year. 
 
5.3. How large is the subsidy? 
The average SkatteFUNN firm applies for a total R&D 
budget across their projects in the order of 2.4 million 
NOK. The median firm applies for 1.6 million NOK. 
The smallest application is only 1000 NOK and the first 
percentile is 65 000 NOK. With 13 353 observations 
this implies that there are more than 130 applications 
smaller than 65 000. An R&D project of 65 000 should 
expect an R&D tax credit of about 13 000 NOK. This 
figure suggests that the application costs for the firms 
must be small – at least for small projects. This is in 
line with estimates in Foyn (2007) based on what firms 
report in a questionnaire survey. They find that the 
average firm spend 30 hours on the application and 10 
hours on the end report. Assuming an hourly costs of 
365, following SSØ, this suggests an average 
application cost is in the order of NOK 15 000. 
Auditing costs seems to add another 5000 NOK for the 
average project. Another important cost component is 
the time spent on documenting for the auditor and tax 
authorities time and costs that has been allocated to 
the project. Presumably time spent on the application, 
reports and auditing varies with the size of the project. 
 
Turning to the actual R&D tax credits granted, the 
average firm with their application accepted, receives 
393 000 NOK. The median firm receives 313 000 NOK. 
The smallest registered tax credit is 370 NOK, and the 
first percentile is 11 000 NOK. 
 
Out of 11 146 firm-year observations with an accepted 
project, 410 firms have their R&D tax credit reduced 
because the sum of the R&D tax credit and other 
subsidies reaches a ceiling for total allowable R&D 
project subsidies allowed by ESA. The average tax 
credit reduction in this group of 410 is 36 %. 41 firm 
year observations have their tax credit withdrawn 
entirely. There is no clear statistical connection 
between the reduction in the R&D tax credit and direct 
R&D subsidies recorded in the R&D surveys. 
 
5.4. How large is the subsidy relative to 
operations? 
Officially, the tax credit is 18 or 20 percent of the 
firms’ R&D spending on project supported by 
SkatteFUNN. However, since indirect costs are 
calculated based on a formula, the actual percentage 
may deviate when the tax credit is seen in relation to 
R&D in the R&D surveys.  
 
Table 5.3 show the total R&D tax credit (intramural and 
extramural) in percent of total R&D as reported in the 
R&D surveys for firms that have received a positive tax 
credit and are included in the R&D surveys. We see that 
the average support is 0.19 percent, i.e. right “on target”. 
For small firms – as measured by employees – the 
average support is somewhat larger, and for large firms 
somewhat smaller. This is even more evident when 
tabulating the support by R&D man-years in table 5.4.  
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Table 5.3. R&D tax credit as share of total R&D reported in the 
R&D surveys by firm size (number of employees) 
Employees     Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
N 
1-5  .30 .20 .31 .37 7 
5-9  .23 .15 .20 .26 61 
10-19   .22 .13 .19 .25 586 
20-49   .20 .10 .17 .22 734 
50-99   .19 .08 .15 .20 581 
100 or more   .14 .03 .09 .17 571 
All firms  .19 .08 .16 .20 2540 
 
Table 5.4. R&D tax credit as share of total R&D reported in the 
R&D surveys by R&D man-years 
R&D man-
years     
Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
N 
0.1 - 0.5  .31 .16 .20 .28 126 
0.5 - 1.0 .27 .15 .20 .27 188 
1.0 - 2.5 .24 .14 .20 .28 682 
2.5 - 5.0 .18 .11 .17 .22 689 
5.0 - 10 .13 .08 .13 .17 446 
10 or more .05 .02 .03 .07 375 
Total  .18 .08 .16 .20 2506 
 
Table 5.5.  R&D tax credit as share of total wage bill 
Employees     Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
N 
1  3.55 0.25 0.52 1.03 852 
2 1.51 0.17 0.35 0.68 796 
3-4 1.18 0.11 0.26 0.48 1300 
5-9  0.24 0.05 0.13 0.24 1809 
10-19   0.09 0.03 0.07 0.12 1801 
20-49   0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 1742 
50-99   0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 798 
100 or more   0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 650 
All firms  0.66 0.02 0.07 0.23 9748 
 
Table 5.6.  R&D tax credit as share of operating profit for firms 
with positive profit 
Employees     Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
N 
1  6.71 0.21 0.59 1.62 397 
2 2.40 0.22 0.54 1.26 423 
3-4 2.30 0.21 0.50 1.15 754 
5-9  1.89 0.11 0.29 0.83 1202 
10-19   1.09 0.08 0.21 0.57 1227 
20-49   0.42 0.05 0.12 0.29 1333 
50-99   0.25 0.03 0.07 0.17 643 
100 or more   0.08 0.00 0.02 0.06 519 
All firms  1.51 0.06 0.19 0.60 6498 
 
Table 5.3 and 5.4 are restricted to firms included in the 
R&D surveys. As discussed in chapter 4, these firms 
tend to be significantly larger than the typical firm 
applying for a tax credit. In tables 5.5-5.9 we relate the 
R&D tax credit to numbers available for all firms. The 
findings can be summarized as follows: For a large 
proportion of firms with less than 5 employees, the 
R&D tax credit is very large relative to the size of the 
firms’ operations, no matter how size is measured. 
About 30 percent of all SkatteFUNN firms have less 
than 5 employees.10 Note also that 89 % of firms with 
less than 5 employees get their R&D tax credit fully or 
partially as a subsidy, i.e. their R&D credit is larger 
than their tax liability. The same applies to 73% of 
firms with 5 or more employees that receive an R&D 
tax credit. 
                                                     
10 The dominance of very small firms may in itself be a signal that 
the scheme is rather generous for this group. 
Table 5.7.  R&D tax credit as share of operating profit for firms 
with negative profit 
Employees     Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
N 
1  2.28 0.24 0.44 1.06 495 
2 1.89 0.23 0.49 1.26 383 
3-4 4.30 0.20 0.47 1.20 554 
5-9  2.31 0.14 0.37 1.04 610 
10-19   2.61 0.07 0.19 0.61 575 
20-49   0.80 0.05 0.14 0.45 409 
50-99   0.80 0.04 0.10 0.32 156 
100 or more  0.15 0.01 0.03 0.11 132 
All firms  2.30 0.11 0.31 0.86 3314 
 
Table 5.8.  R&D tax credit as share of total income 
Employees     Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
N 
1  1.98 0.07 0.19 0.51 893 
2 2.80 0.05 0.13 0.34 820 
3-4 0.67 0.03 0.09 0.23 1326 
5-9  0.29 0.01 0.04 0.11 1841 
10-19   0.25 0.01 0.02 0.05 1825 
20-49   0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 1767 
50-99   0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 814 
100 or more  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 675 
All firms  0.60 0.01 0.02 0.09 9961 
 
Table 5.9.  R&D tax credit per employee 
Employees    Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
N 
1  276 82 184 386 920 
2 151 50 106 211 822 
3-4 107 40 85 170 1336 
5-9  60 20 47 90 1855 
10-19   33 11 27 51 1837 
20-49   14 5 13 21 1774 
50-99   7 3 7 11 815 
100 or more  3 1 2 4 679 
All firms  72 9 29 80 10038 
 
 
5.5. Reported additionality in the SkatteFUNN 
database 
Although we follow an econometric approach to 
estimating the additionality effect of the SkatteFUNN, 
it is also interesting to look at assessments of 
additionality made by firms and bureaucrats. In their 
application to SkatteFUNN, firms must state what they 
think will happen to the proposed project if it is not 
given support through SkatteFUNN. The alternatives 
given are “Carried out at the same scale and time 
horizon”, “Carried out at the same scale, but 
postponed”, “Limited”, “Postponed” or “Dropped”. The 
firms repeat the same exercise in the final report for 
the project. As a part of the application processing, 
Innovation Norway grades projects on a scale from one 
to seven according to whether they believe that the 
project would be undertaken anyway. In the following, 
we take a closer look at these additionality estimates. 
In section 6.10, we get back to these measures and use 
the ex-post self-assessment of additionality together 
with information on reported R&D and assumptions 
about the quantitative degree of additionality 
associated with the different qualitative additionality 
statements to obtain one of our estimates of “the bang 
for the buck”, i.e how much additionality that is 
generated per krone of forgone taxes.  
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Firms may submit several applications per year, and 
projects may span several years. To obtain unique firm-
year observations of additionality in order to compare 
them with the firm-year observations of reported R&D, 
we weight the different additionality assessments of 
different projects in the same years with the year-
specific costs share of the actual projects in the same 
years. In the tables below, we do not report year-
specific assessments of additionality. We have carried 
out the same analyses by year, and results are very 
similar across years.  
 
Table 5.10 reports self-reported additionality from the 
firms’ applications. Around twelve percent of the firms 
stated that they would carry out the project regardless 
of support, while around 17 percent would postpone or 
drop the project. In table 5.11 we see that at for firms 
that actually completed a project, there is a larger 
fraction, around 23 percent, that states that the project 
would have been dropped without support. However, 
one should note that the firms and projects behind the 
two tables are different. Some projects are rejected, 
and some are not yet finished. There is also some 
degree of missing information for these variables. 
Table 5.12 then reports both ex ante and ex post 
additionality from a balanced sample, i.e. for projects 
where there is both ex ante and ex post self-assess-
ment. Interestingly, the perceived additionality is 
larger ex post than ex ante. Fewer firms say that the 
project would have been carried out anyway, and more 
firms say that they would have dropped the projects. 
Comparing small and large firms in table 5.13 (where 
firms are classified according to the tax deduction rate 
in SkatteFUNN), we see that there is a slight tendency 
that self-reported additionality is higher among the 
smaller firms. 
 
Table 5.14 shows that the distribution of grades in 
Innovation Norway’s ex ante evaluation is quite 
symmetric around the middle alternative 4. In table 
5.15, we compare this grading with firms’ self-reported 
ex-post additionality. We see that there is a slight 
tendency that projects that Innovation Norway 
believed would be carried out anyway, reports lower 
additionality ex post.  
 
 
Table 5.10. Ex ante self-reported additionality: ("What will 
happen to the project if it is not supported through 
SkatteFUNN?") Percent 
Carried out at the same scale and time horizon 12 
Carried out at the same scale, but postponed 14 
Limited scale 52 
Postponed 13 
Dropped 4 
Do not know 5 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.11.Ex post self-reported additionality: ("What would 
have happened to the project if it was not 
supported through SkatteFUNN?") Percent 
Carried out at the same scale and time horizon 13
Carried out at the same scale, but postponed 13
Limited scale 46
Postponed 15
Dropped 8
Do not know 5
 
 
Table 5.12.Ex ante and ex-post self-reported additionality. 
Percent 
 Ex ante Ex post
Carried out at the same scale and time horizon 16 14
Carried out at the same scale, but postponed 15 13
Limited scale 51 46
Postponed 11 15
Dropped 4 7
Do not know 4 5
 
 
Table 5.13. Ex post self-reported additionality Small and large 
firms. Percent 
 Small firms 
(deduction 
rate 20 
percent)
Large 
firms 
(deduction 
rate 18 
percent)
Carried out at the same scale and time 
horizon 
12 17
Carried out at the same scale, but 
postponed 
13 13
Limited scale 46 53
Postponed 17 8
Dropped 8 5
Do not know 4 4
 
 
Table 5.14.  Ex ante evaluation by Innovation Norway (“Will the 
project be carried out anyway?” Grades 1-7)  
Grade  Percent
1 4
2 11
3 20
4 37
5 16
6 9
7 2
 
 
Table 5.15. Ex post self-reported additionality vs ex-ante 
evaluation by Innovation Norway  
 IN grade 
1-3 
IN grade 
4 
IN grade 
5-7 
Carried out at the same scale 
and time horizon 
16   12 9 
Carried out at the same scale, 
but postponed 
13   13 12 
Limited scale 47   45 46 
Postponed 14   15 17 
Dropped 6   9 11 
Do not know 4   6 4 
 
 
5.6. Aggregate R&D growth 
The SkatteFUNN reform was to a large extent 
motivated by low R&D activity in Norwegian industry 
and the goal of the government to increase R&D 
investments in the Norwegian economy from about 1.6 
% of GNP to about 3 % of GDP by 2010. A successful 
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scheme should therefore show up in aggregate R&D 
investments. This is hardly the case. As seen in Figure 
5.5, nominal intramural R&D investments have only 
had a slight increase, and it has not at all kept up with 
the economic growth rate. Extramural R&D has 
actually fallen, see Figure 5.6.  
However, looking at the size of aggregate R&D tax 
credits relative to aggregate R&D, it also becomes clear 
that it would take an extreme degree of additionality 
for this policy instrument to move aggregate industrial 
R&D investments by much. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Intramural R&D for firms with ore than 10 employees 
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Figure 5.6. Extramural R&D for firms with more than 10 empolyees 
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Figure 5.7. Intramural R&D for firms  with 10-19 employees 
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Figure 5.8. Extramural R&E for firms with 10-19 employees 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
M
ill
io
n 
N
O
K
Other sources
From Universities and institutes
 
 
 
Given that the tax scheme is restricted to R&D 
investments below 8 million, it may be more relevant 
to look at the aggregate R&D investments for small 
firms. Figure 5.7 shows aggregate intramural R&D for 
firms with 10-19 workers. Here, one can clearly see 
growth in the R&D investments from 2001 to 2003. 
Thereafter investments level off, but that is to be 
expected when firms have reached a level of R&D that 
is adapted to the subsidy. However, it is also evident 
from Figure 5.7 that the growth in R&D from 2001 to 
2003 was part of a trend starting before SkatteFUNN 
was introduced, and it is hard do see a pattern at all in 
extramural R&D investments for small firms, see figure 
5.8. In any case, SkatteFUNN is only one of several 
changes in the economic climate that may affect firms’ 
R&D investments. A causal effect of the scheme can 
therefore not be identified looking only at macro data, 
and we will now turn to a microeconometric analysis. 
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6.1. Short term additionality 
We start out with a simple descriptive relationship 
where firms’ R&D investments are explained by their 
sales, direct R&D subsidies, a fixed effect capturing 
their underlying inclination to invest in R&D, year 
dummies capturing common macroeconomics shocks 
and firm specific temporary shocks such as ideas for 
new products and processes.  
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Including firm specific fixed effects, ηi, implies that we 
are explaining deviations from each firm’s average 
level of R&D. It also means that we control for all 
differences across firms, and hence between firms 
above and below the cap, that are constant over the 
estimation period. A change in the R&D subsidy regime 
like SkatteFUNN should be picked up by the year 
dummies as firms should do more R&D than “usual” 
when there is a generous subsidy regime. 
 
Our sample consists of firms that are present in the 
R&D surveys and that have reported positive R&D in at 
least one year prior to the introduction of SkatteFUNN 
and that never have reported real R&D investments 
above 40 million NOK. Observations with R&D 
intensity (R&D/sales) above 5, and observations with 
zero R&D in the R&D surveys, but a positive R&D tax 
credit in the tax record are excluded. Observations that 
lack variables used in the analysis are also excluded. 
The sample period is 1993 to 2005. 
 
The estimated coefficients are reported in table 6.1., 
column (1). 1993 is the base year and the year dummies 
represent differences in average R&D investments 
compared to 1993. We see that there is substantial year-
to-year variation in average R&D investments, even 
when changes in sales are controlled for. However, 
there is no clear shift in the level of R&D from 2002 
onwards, when SkatteFUNN was introduced. This is 
more clearly brought out in column (2), comparing pre- 
and post-SkatteFUNN years using only one coefficient. 
Conditioning on sales, subsidies and firm specific levels 
of R&D investments, firms do not seem to invest 
significantly more in R&D after SkatteFUNN was 
introduced. This is consistent with the modest growth in 
aggregate R&D investments reported in figure 1.  
 
Table 6.1, column (3) takes into account that only firms 
that would invest less than 4 million NOK have an 
incentive to increase their R&D investments in response 
to SkatteFUNN. Hence, equation 6.1 is expanded by 
interaction terms between the year dummies and a 
dummy for average pre SkatteFUNN R&D being below 4 
million. This specification corresponds to the semi-
structural equation (3.3) above with common time 
specific error terms and with the user price exchanged for 
a dummy variable that is one if a firm is eligible for a tax 
credit on their marginal R&D investment. We also include 
direct subsidies to R&D as an explanatory variable. 
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As explained we do not know for sure whether a firm is 
eligible for a subsidy on their marginal R&D. This is 
because we do not know how much R&D each firm 
would do in absence of SkatteFUNN. We have 
experimented extensively with building models to predict 
R&D investments in absence of SkatteFUNN, and we have 
concluded that it is difficult to do much better than using 
the latest R&D observation prior to SkatteFUNN although 
there is some information in earlier R&D observations 
also. As explained in chapter 3.1, however, using only the 
latest R&D observation will imply a regression-to-the-
mean bias. To avoid this, we base the classification on the 
average level of R&D prior to SkatteFUNN. This predicts 
future R&D almost as well as using the latest observation 
only. Hence, Dbelow cap in equation 6.2 is one if a firm on 
average invested less than 4 million in R&D in those of 
the years 1993 to 2001 when it was observed.11
                                                     
11 The comparison is based on real R&D investments in 2003 NOK. 
See chapter 4. 
6. Econometric results
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Table 6.1. Short term additionality of SkatteFUNN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(sales)  0,375***  0,379***  0,365***  0,367*** 
 (0,119) (0,112) (0,117) (0,118) 
ln (direct subsidies)  0,367***  0,368***  0,361***  0,363*** 
 (0,022) (0,022) (0,022) (0,022) 
Dummy for 1995  0,427**   0,157  0,443** 
 (0,190)  (0,315) (0,189) 
Dummy for 1997  0,417*  -0,025  0,433* 
 (0,224)  (0,437) (0,223) 
Dummy for 1999 -0,167  -0,299 -0,152 
 (0,227)  (0,432) (0,226) 
Dummy for 2001  0,808***  -0,079  0,813*** 
 (0,222)  (0,403) (0,222) 
Dummy for 2002  0,456**  -0,369 -0,095 
 (0,224)  (0,405) (0,268) 
Dummy for 2003  0,809***  -0,419  0,239 
 (0,228)  (0,420) (0,276) 
Dummy for 2004  0,934***  -0,008  0,359 
 (0,233)  (0,428) (0,276) 
Dummy for 2005  0,293  -0,927**  -0,276 
 (0,240)  (0,441) (0,286) 
Post SkatteFUNN year   0,259**   
  (0,105)   
Dummy for 1995 * below 4 mill    0,419  
   (0,388)  
Dummy for 1997 * below 4 mill    0,635  
   (0,504)  
Dummy for 1999 * below 4 mill    0,249  
   (0,500)  
Dummy for 2001 * below 4 mill    1,195**   
   (0,477)  
Dummy for 2002 * below 4 mill    1,116**   
   (0,481)  
Dummy for 2003 * below 4 mill    1,655***  
   (0,494)  
Dummy for 2004 * below 4 mill    1,264**   
   (0,500)  
Dummy for 2005 * below 4 mill    1,643***  
   (0,512)  
Post SkatteFUNN year * below 4 mill     0,755*** 
    (0,219) 
Constant term  0,105  0,402  0,188  0,189 
 (1,344) (1,289) (1,320) (1,332) 
Adj R-sq (within)  0,074  0,061  0,079  0,077 
No. of obs. 8233 8233 8233 8233 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include firm fixed effects.  
Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Looking at column (3) we find that the year dummies 
for the firms that on average invested less than 4 
million before SkatteFUNN, are larger after the 
introduction of SkatteFUNN. Column (4) makes this 
even clearer, when the dummy for pre SkatteFUNN 
R&D being below 4 million is interacted with a single 
dummy for post SkatteFUNN years. The results in 
column (4) correspond to the two group comparison 
done in chapter 3.1. We see that firms below the cap – 
those that have their marginal cost of R&D investments 
reduced – have larger R&D investments after the 
introduction of SkatteFUNN than firms above the cap. 
The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level. The 
point estimate of 0.755 log points imply a little more 
than a doubling of R&D investments. This result 
suggests that SkatteFUNN strongly stimulate firms’ 
R&D investments. However, like the two group 
comparison, this interpretation build on the 
assumption that there are no other macroeconomic 
changes that affect firms above and below the cap 
differently12. Furthermore, the effect is largely driven 
by firms that in some years prior to SkatteFUNN have 
reported zero R&D and in some years positive R&D. 
Hence the high growth is typically from a very low 
level. If we only include firms that always report 
positive R&D, the estimated coefficient becomes 
slightly negative and insignificant. If we include these 
firms, but treat zero R&D as missing – one might 
suspect that this is the case for some of the 
observations – we get a coefficient that is substantially 
reduced. If, on the other hand we include all firms in 
the R&D surveys, also those that never reported R&D 
prior to SkatteFUNN, the estimated coefficient 
increases. 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 One such effect is that firms that do more than 4 million in 
intramural R&D but less than 8 million in total R&D may have an 
incentive to substitute intramural R&D for extramural R&D. 
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Table 6.2. Short term additionality of SkatteFUNN, controlling for participation in the scheme 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ln(intramural R&D) ln(intramural R&D) ln(R&D man-years) ln(R&D man-years) 
ln(sales) 0,325*** 0,328*** 0,321*** 0,324*** 
 (0,112) (0,113) (0,114) (0,115) 
Ln(direct subsidies) 0,358*** 0,359*** 0,336*** 0,337*** 
 (0,022) (0,022) (0,022) (0,022) 
Dummy for 1995 0,157 0,434** 0,095 0,425** 
 (0,314) (0,188) (0,306) (0,192) 
Dummy for 1997 -0,050 0,433* -0,107 0,367 
 (0,435) (0,221) (0,429) (0,224) 
Dummy for 1999 -0,301 -0,147 -0,248 -0,147 
 (0,431) (0,224) (0,427) (0,229) 
Dummy for 2001 -0,032 0,857*** -0,061 0,878*** 
 (0,398) (0,219) (0,391) (0,223) 
Dummy for 2002 -0,544 -0,184 -0,456 -0,057 
 (0,409) (0,287) (0,410) (0,294) 
Dummy for 2003 -1,105** -0,467 -0,982** -0,368 
 (0,459) (0,311) (0,459) (0,317) 
Dummy for 2004 -0,708 -0,418 -0,505 -0,233 
 (0,463) (0,308) (0,464) (0,315) 
Dummy for 2005 -1,528*** -0,795** -1,354*** -0,602* 
 (0,473) (0,315) (0,479) (0,323) 
Dummy for 1995 * below 4 mill 0,408  0,477  
 (0,386)  (0,385)  
Dummy for 1997 * below 4 mill 0,665  0,657  
 (0,501)  (0,499)  
Dummy for 1999 * below 4 mill 0,259  0,195  
 (0,498)  (0,499)  
Dummy for 2001 * below 4 mill 1,192**  1,258***  
 (0,471)  (0,470)  
Dummy for 2002 * below 4 mill 0,927*  0,826*  
 (0,485)  (0,491)  
Dummy for 2003 * below 4 mill 1,312**  1,126**  
 (0,533)  (0,537)  
Dummy for 2004 * below 4 mill 0,848  0,668  
 (0,535)  (0,541)  
Dummy for 2005 * below 4 mill 1,439***  1,310**  
 (0,543)  (0,554)  
SkatteFUNN 1,498*** 1,453*** 1,415*** 1,394*** 
 (0,253) (0,222) (0,256) (0,225) 
SkatteFUNN * below 4 mill 1,282*** 1,331*** 1,352*** 1,370*** 
 (0,298) (0,259) (0,303) (0,263) 
Post SkatteFUNN year * below 4 mill  0,445*  0,288 
  (0,260)  (0,267) 
Constant  0,619 0,618 -6,101*** -6,103*** 
 (1,265) (1,278) (1,284) (1,299) 
Adj R-sq (within) 0,132 0,130 0,119 0,117 
No. of obs. 8233 8233 8233 8233 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D) in column (1) and (2) and ln(intramural R&D man-years) in column (3) and (4). All specifications include firm fixed.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Following the international literature summarized in 
chapter 3.2, we use the natural log of R&D as our left 
hand side variable. Since the log of zero is not 
determined, a specific choice must be made regarding 
how to treat observations with zero R&D. The standard 
way to get around this problem is to set ln(R&D) equal 
to zero for firms with no R&D. In our case this is the 
same as assuming that firms reporting no formal R&D 
actually invest 1000 NOK on R&D “informally”. When 
these observations turn out to drive the magnitude of 
the results, we should be careful not to interpret the 
coefficients literally as their size will be sensitive to this 
choice.  
 
Many of the firms classified as having an incentive to 
increase their R&D investments do not use the 
SkatteFUNN tax credit. Hence, comparing growth rates 
among those firms that self-select into the scheme also 
has some interest. Again, we would expect firms below 
the cap to have larger growth in R&D investments than 
those above the cap, and due to the selection process, 
we expect to see larger coefficients for both groups. 
The specification we use is 
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The results are reported in table 6.2. 
 
We see that all firms do more R&D than they usually 
do when they receive support from SkatteFUNN, since 
the coefficient for the SkatteFUNN variable is 
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significantly positive. This is most likely a selection 
effect: Firms with a good research idea self-select into 
the scheme. More importantly, for firms that used to 
do less than 4 million R&D prior to SkatteFUNN the 
positive effect is much larger, since for these firms the 
SkatteFUNN “effect” is the sum of the coefficients for 
the SkatteFUNN and SkatteFUNN * below 4 mill. 
Assuming that the former captures a common self-
selection effect, the latter is an estimate of the increase 
that is due to the tax credit itself. Interestingly, those 
that used to do less than 4 million R&D and that do not 
apply for SkatteFUNN support increase their reported 
R&D more than those above the cap that did not apply, 
although this difference is only weakly significant 
when we measure R&D as intramural R&D and 
insignificant when R&D man-years is our dependent 
variable. This casts some doubt on the results. One 
might e.g. worry that some of the reported zeros prior 
to SkatteFUNN are not true, and that the data quality 
is better in more recent years. This would give such an 
effect.  
 
6.2. Long term additionality 
Our results are consistent with SkatteFUNN having 
positive additionality, although the growth seems to be 
most strongly associated with firms that did very little 
R&D prior to SkatteFUNN. An interesting follow-up 
question is whether the effect is stronger in the long 
run than in the short run. This is plausible, as there 
may be some fixed and irreversible costs associated 
with building up research capacity in firms. On simple 
way to assess this question within the regression 
framework used in table 6.2 is to add terms for the first 
year a firm receives support from SkatteFUNN. If the 
effect increases over time we should see a negative 
coefficient on the first year variable for firms that are 
below the cap. This is tested in table 6.3. The 
specification is similar to the one in table 6.2, column 
(2), and adds interaction terms between the 
SkatteFUNN dummies and whether a firm receives 
support for the first time. The coefficient is close to 
zero and insignificant.  
 
 
Table 6.3. Specific coefficients for the first year with support 
Dependent variable ln(intramural R&D) 
SkatteFUNN  1,386*** 
 (0,224) 
SkatteFUNN * below 4 mill  1,357*** 
 (0,273) 
SkatteFUNN, first year  -0,150 
 (0,145) 
SkatteFUNN, first year * below 4 mill   0,105 
 (0,173) 
Adj R-sq (within) 0.117 
No. of obs. 8233 
The constant term, ln (sales), ln (direct subsidies), a post SkatteFUNN year 
dummy and interacted with “below 4 mill” are not reported. The sample and 
specification is identical to table 6.2, except for the two first-year variables.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6.4. Two and four year R&D growth rates for 
SkatteFUNN firms 
 Growth 
2001-2003 
Growth
 2001-2005 
Sales growth -0,441 0,578 
 (0,380) (0,359) 
Growth in subsidies 0,204*** 0,261*** 
 (0,058) (0,066) 
Dummy for below 4 mill -0,526 -0,043 
 (0,489) (0,593) 
SkatteFUNN 2003 1,841*** 2,550*** 
 (0,579) (0,698) 
SkatteFUNN 2003 * below 4 mill  1,946*** 0,638 
 (0,692) (0,836) 
No. of obs. 616 616 
The dependent variables are log differences in intramural R&D. The estimation 
method is censored normal regression.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6.5. Dynamic specification 
ln(intramural R&Dt-2) 0,102** 
 (0,041) 
ln(sales) 0,128 
 (0,254) 
ln (direct subsidies) 0,306*** 
 (0,040) 
Dummy for 2001  -0,404 
 (0,555) 
Dummy for 2003  -1,214 
 (0,920) 
Dummy for 2005  -1,693 
 (1,254) 
Dummy for 1999 * below 4 mill  -0,735 
 (0,461) 
Dummy for 2001 * below 4 mill 0,579 
 (0,510) 
Dummy for 2003* below 4 mill 1,001* 
 (0,596) 
Dummy for 2005* below 4 mill 0,802 
 (0,603) 
SkatteFUNN 1,390*** 
 (0,421) 
SkatteFUNN* below 4 mill 0,758 
 (0,512) 
Constant 0,069 
 (0,355) 
No. of obs. 1643 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specification include a firm 
fixed and is estimated using the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) methodology..  
* Significant at the 10 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
An alternative way to assess the long run effect of 
SkatteFUNN is to look explicitly at short term growth 
rates vs long run growth rates. In table 6.4 this is done 
for the 616 firms within our main sample that are 
observed both in 2001, 2003 and 2005. 
 
Once again there is little to indicate that the long run 
effects are larger than the short run effects. Actually, 
the growth from 2001 to 2003 is larger than the 
growth from 2001 to 2005 for SkatteFUNN firms below 
the cap. 
 
A third way to assess the long run effect is to use a 
dynamic specification explicitly modelling that 
previous R&D affects present R&D. This can be done by 
including previous R&D as an explanatory variable. 
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Combining a lagged dependent variable with a fixed 
effect demands an instrumental variable technique. 
The “state of the art” is to use the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) GMM estimator. However, this estimator is 
constructed for situations with annual observations. 
For most of our sample, R&D information is only 
available every second year. This is easily handled with 
two stage least squares, the standard approach prior to 
Arellano and Bond. Following Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) we use the first difference transformation to 
control for the fixed effects, and then use lnR&Dt-4 and 
lnR&Dt-6 as instruments for ΔlnR&Dt-2. The results are 
presented in table 6.5. We see that lagged R&D two 
years back has significant explanatory power. In order 
to simplify the calculations, we may assume that the 
firms enter SkatteFUNN permanently in a year not 
included in the sample. The coefficient 0.102 then 
implies that long term effect of SkatteFUNN is 
0.758/(1-0.102)=0.844, i.e. 8 percent larger than the 
short term effect. From a theoretical point of view, this 
specification is our preferred one. However, since only 
observations observed every second year, six times in a 
row can be included, a lot of observations cannot be 
used, and many of these observations will be from 
small firms.  
 
6.3. The probability to start or continue R&D 
In the main analysis we have left out firms that never 
invested in R&D prior to SkatteFUNN, arguing that the 
decision to start doing R&D for the first time is 
different from deciding how much R&D to do given 
that the firm has some R&D experience. In this chapter 
we analyze the probability of starting to do R&D given 
that one did not do R&D two years earlier. We also 
analyze the probability of continuing to do R&D given 
that one did R&D two years earlier. The results are 
reported in table 6.6. 
 
We find that in the years 2003 and 2004, i.e. after 
SkatteFUNN was introduced, firms that did not do R&D 
two years earlier had a 6-7 percentage points higher 
probability of starting to do R&D as compared to the 
years 1995-2001. This is consistent with SkatteFUNN 
being successful in stimulating increased R&D activities 
in small firms. It is interesting to note that this is not the 
case in 2005. Firms that did not do R&D in 2003 – when 
SkatteFUNN was available – had a lower probability of 
starting to do R&D as compared to the probability in the 
years 1995-2001. Our interpretation is that this is a 
selected group of firms with particularly low probability 
of starting to do R&D. The pool of potential R&D firms 
among those that did not do R&D seems to be 
exhausted quickly after the scheme is introduced. 
 
Looking next at the probability of continuing to do 
R&D, given that a firm did R&D two years ago, we find 
that this probability is 10-16 percentage points higher 
in the years after SkatteFUNN was introduced. Here 
the effect of SkatteFUNN is permanent. 
 
Table 6.6. The probability of starting or continuing R&D 
 Intramural Intramural 
 R&Dt-2=0 R&Dt-2>0 
ln(sales) 0,036*** 0,045*** 
 (0,008) (0,014) 
ln(sales)t-2 -0,004 -0,004 
 (0,008) (0,013) 
Dummy for 2003† 0,104*** 0,133*** 
 (0,014) (0,015) 
Dummy for 2004† 0,073*** 0,160*** 
 (0,016) (0,014) 
Dummy for 2005† -0,017 0,072*** 
 (0,011) (0,015) 
Pseudo R-sq 0,088 0,087 
No. of obs. 7286 3851 
† Marginal effect for discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. The 
years 1995-2001 is absorbed by the constant term and not reported. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6.7. Effects on R&D cooperation 
 Extramural R&D 
from research 
institutions 
Extramural R&D 
from research 
institutions 
 R&Dt-2=0 R&Dt-2>0 
ln(sales) 0,023*** 0,051** 
 (0,004) (0,026) 
ln(sales)t-2 -0,002 0,008 
 (0,004) (0,025) 
Dummy for 2003† 0,024*** -0,017 
 (0,007) (0,043) 
Dummy for 2004† 0,012* 0,014 
 (0,007) (0,045) 
Dummy for 2005† -0,010**  -0,085** 
 (0,005) (0,038) 
Pseudo R-sq 0,106 0,072 
No. of obs. 9795 1316 
† Marginal effect for discrete change of the dummy 
 
 
6.4. The probability to start or continue R&D 
cooperation 
SkatteFUNN is designed with a special focus to 
encourage R&D done in cooperation with universities, 
colleges and research institutes. For this type of R&D 
the cap is 8 million, i.e. firms that do 4 million 
intramural R&D can receive a tax credit for an 
additional 4 million extramural R&D done in 
cooperation with universities, colleges and research 
institutes. If they do less than 4 million intramural 
R&D they can transfer the unspent quota and get a tax 
credit for cooperative projects with a budget up to 8 
million.In this section we analyzed the probability to 
start or continue such cooperative R&D.  
 
Table 6.7, column (1), looks at the probability to start 
buying R&D from research institutions for firms that 
did not do so two years earlier. We see that there is 
some evidence suggesting that this probability has 
increased after the introduction of SkatteFUNN with a 
positive and significant coefficient in 2003 and 2004. 
The effect levels off, and in 2005 the coefficient is 
significantly negative. For all years the size of the effect 
is small, about 1-2 percentage points evaluated for 
mean values of the other variables. Moving on to 
column (2), using a sample of firms that did buy R&D 
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from universities, colleges and research institutes two 
years earlier, we see that there is no evidence to 
suggest that the probability to continue to buy such 
R&D increased for this group after the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN. 
 
Taken together, the data does not suggest that 
SkatteFUNN has had a large impact on the incentive to 
buy R&D from universities, colleges and research 
institutes. We will return to this issue in section 6.9. 
 
6.5. Estimates based on historic R&D reported 
in the SkatteFUNN database 
Perhaps the major data problem in the evaluation of 
the SkatteFUNN scheme is that a disproportionately 
large share of the R&D projects supported by the 
SkatteFUNN scheme is carried out by small firms, e.g. 
firms with less than five or ten employees, cf. chapter 
4. Historically, these firms are not covered well by the 
R&D surveys. Therefore we have little direct and 
independent information of the R&D activity of these 
firms prior to the launching of the SkatteFUNN 
scheme. However, information about these firms has 
been collected as part of the application process. To 
what extent this information is reliable is an open 
question. These data have not previously been used for 
any analytic purpose. R&D variables are reported for 
up to three years after the R&D in question was 
conducted – and the firms may report strategically in a 
way they think benefits their application. In general, 
the results confirm our findings above, and the quality 
of the data seems surprisingly high. 
 
In the SkatteFUNN application, firms must state their 
level of R&D investments in the three previous years. 
In principle, this information is just as “valid” as the 
information of firms’ R&D investment from the R&D 
survey. However, the R&D surveys are collected about 
6 months after the investment year, independently 
year by year, and the numbers are revised by Statistics 
Norway. In the SkatteFUNN application, firms are 
asked for information up to three years back in time, 
all at once, and the reported numbers are not of direct 
relevance to the application. Moreover, the R&D 
surveys are conducted independent of SkatteFUNN, 
while the information in the SkatteFUNN scheme is 
given in a particular setting. Firms may think 
strategically in terms of maximizing the probability of 
receiving support through the tax credit scheme. This 
may possibly bias the self-reported previous R&D 
investments. However, the direction of such a bias is 
not obvious. Firms may think that a high level of 
previous R&D may signal high R&D capability, thereby 
giving extra credibility to the application. They may 
also think that since one of the main goals of the 
scheme is to increase overall R&D, stating a low level 
of R&D will all else equal increase the chance of 
approval. We regard the information of previous R&D 
from the applications to be of lower quality than that 
from the R&D survey, but the direction and magnitude 
of bias is not clear. 
 
Since SkatteFUNN was introduced in 2002, R&D 
information from applications dates back to 1999 at 
the earliest. Many firms have submitted several 
applications, both within the same year and in 
consecutive years. This means that there may be 
several observations of R&D for the same firm and 
year. In many cases, the figures are non-corresponding. 
For each firm and year, we have used the average of all 
the stated levels of R&D as our measure of historical 
R&D investments. For the years where firms actually 
carried out SkatteFUNN projects, we have used the 
level of R&D submitted to and approved by the tax 
authorities. For firms with high R&D, this measure may 
be downward biased, as there is no incentive to report 
more than the maximum level of R&D eligible for tax 
deduction (4 millions for intramural R&D). In fact, we 
see that there is a tendency of a clustering around 4 
millions, but it is not large, and many firms report R&D 
that is well above this level. However, this is likely to 
bias the post SkatteFUNN changes in R&D for large 
R&D firms downward. 
 
Contrary to the sample based on the R&D surveys, the 
SkatteFUNN database consists only of firms that have 
applied for support through SkatteFUNN. The majority 
of them have also received support. Implicitly, the 
questions we attempt to answer in our econometric 
analyses are then slightly different: Have SkatteFUNN 
increased the R&D of these firms after the scheme was 
introduced? Is this increase higher in the years when 
they actually get support from SkatteFUNN? We use 
the same econometric specifications, i.e. variations of 
equation (6.1) and (6.2), and the same basic sample 
criteria as in the main analysis based on the R&D 
surveys. As for the interpretation of the results, the 
challenges related to selection bias still apply, and 
there is an additional dimension since the sample of 
firms are those who have chosen to apply for support 
through SkatteFUNN. Even if the main information is 
taken from another sample, covering an important part 
of the population of firms, the additionality estimates 
we obtain are not independent from the ones reported 
above, since the new dataset does not help us in 
resolving the fundamental problem associated with 
identifying the true effect of SkatteFUNN. 
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Table 6.8. Short term additionality of SkatteFUNN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant term 1.914*** 2.541*** 2.121*** 2.693*** 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.196) (0.198) 
ln(sales) 0.237*** 0.317*** 0.214*** 0.300*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Dummy for 2000 0.858***  0.469**  
 (0.070)  (0.198)  
Dummy for 2001 1.782***  0.741***  
 (0.066)  (0.187)  
Dummy for 2002 2.049***  0.552***  
 (0.066)  (0.186)  
Dummy for 2003 2.330***  0.160  
 (0.066)  (0.187)  
Dummy for 2004 2.362***  -0.144  
 (0.069)  (0.191)  
Dummy for 2005 2.384***  -0.159  
 (0.074)  (0.197)  
Post SkatteFUNN year  0.930***  -0.575*** 
  (0.030)  (0.080) 
Dummy for 2000 * below 4 mill   0.418**  
   (0.211)  
Dummy for 2001 * below 4 mill   1.191***  
   (0.199)  
Dummy for 2002 * below 4 mill   1.723***  
   (0.198)  
Dummy for 2003 * below 4 mill   2.483***  
   (0.199)  
Dummy for 2004 * below 4 mill   2.889***  
   (0.204)  
Dummy for 2005 * below 4 mill   2.963***  
   (0.211)  
Post SkatteFUNN year * below 4 mill    1.731*** 
    (0.086) 
Observations 14831 14831 14831 14831 
Number of firms 3264 3264 3264 3264 
R-squared (within) 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.14 
This table corresponds to table 6.1. The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include firm fixed effects.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6.8 corresponds directly to table 6.1, but the 
base year is 1999 and the year dummies in columns 
(1) and (3) represent differences in average R&D 
investments compared to 1999. We see that there is a 
clear trend within the sample of SkatteFUNN firms that 
the level of R&D investments increases over time, but it 
is not obvious from column (1) that there was a clear 
shift around the introduction of the scheme. In column 
(3) and (4) we take into account that only those that 
would otherwise invest less than 4 millions have 
incentives on the margin to increase their level of R&D 
in response to SkatteFUNN. Similar to the main 
analysis, we use average R&D prior to SkatteFUNN as 
our predictor for R&D investments in absence of the 
scheme. It is very clear that the year dummies for the 
firms that on average invested less than 4 millions 
before SkatteFUNN are much larger for the years after 
the introduction. Abstracting from single years in 
column (4) makes this even clearer. The results 
strongly suggest that firms who have incentives to 
increase their R&D because of SkatteFUNN actually do 
so. The estimated additionality effect is even larger 
than what is reported in table 6.1, but this may partly 
reflect that the effect is to a large extent driven by 
firms that did very little R&D prior to SkatteFUNN, and 
that there are relatively more such firms in this sample 
than in the sample from the R&D surveys. 
In table 6.9, which corresponds closely to table 6.2., 
we allow the effects to vary not only with the existence 
of SkatteFUNN, but with actual use of the scheme (in a 
given year). We do the analysis both on the full sample 
of applicants (columns 1 and 2), and on the sample of 
firms who have received support from the scheme 
(column 3 and 4). The results are very similar across 
samples. Firms who invested less than 4 millions 
before SkatteFUNN, increase their investments after 
the scheme was introduced, even in the years when 
they did not receive any support. The coefficient is 
(0.349+0.019) in column (4). However, the increase is 
much stronger in the years that they actually received 
support (1.868+0.681). It is interesting to note that 
for firms with prior investment above the cap, the 
introduction of the scheme did not seem to have any 
effect, while the investments appear to have been 
reduced in the years that they used SkatteFUNN. This 
effect is probably related to the different reporting of 
prior and current R&D as discussed above. 
 
Our identification strategy relies upon the assumption 
that the incentives in SkatteFUNN differ fundamentally 
below and above the cap. In table 6.10, we therefore 
experiment with sample restrictions that are tighter 
around the cap of 4 million kroner. Comparing column 
(1) and column (2), we see that the high additionality 
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estimate is largely driven by firms that conducted very 
little R&D before SkatteFUNN, but the estimate in 
column (2) still amounts to more than a doubling. 
Column (3) and (4) narrow the sample even more. The 
effect is still positive, though more modest. This may 
reflect that the incentives to increase R&D are weaker 
closer to the cap, and that it is harder to predict firms 
over or below the cap the closer their “true level” is to 
the cap.  
 
 
Table 6.9. Short term additionality of SkatteFUNN, controlling for participation in the scheme 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant term 2.258*** 2.955*** 2.937*** 3.488*** 
 (0.193) (0.194) (0.209) (0.212) 
ln(sales) 0.216*** 0.271*** 0.217*** 0.279*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 
Dummy for 2000 0.515***  0.508***  
 (0.195)  (0.196)  
Dummy for 2001 0.844***  0.859***  
 (0.185)  (0.186)  
Dummy for 2002 0.925***  0.965***  
 (0.196)  (0.200)  
Dummy for 2003 0.781***  0.845***  
 (0.218)  (0.225)  
Dummy for 2004 0.611***  0.675***  
 (0.235)  (0.242)  
Dummy for 2005 0.584**  0.605**  
 (0.238)  (0.244)  
Post SkatteFUNN year  -0.058  -0.019 
  (0.130)  (0.141) 
Dummy for 2000 * below 4 mill 0.327  0.326  
 (0.208)  (0.210)  
Dummy for 2001 * below 4 mill 0.912***  0.955***  
 (0.197)  (0.199)  
Dummy for 2002 * below 4 mill 0.782***  0.594***  
 (0.209)  (0.214)  
Dummy for 2003 * below 4 mill 1.135***  0.701***  
 (0.231)  (0.240)  
Dummy for 2004 * below 4 mill 1.229***  0.784***  
 (0.250)  (0.259)  
Dummy for 2001 * below 4 mill 1.275***  0.913***  
 (0.255)  (0.262)  
Post SkatteFUNN year * below 4 mill  0.556***  0.349** 
  (0.137)  (0.151) 
SkatteFUNN 0.707*** 0.648*** 0.740*** 0.681*** 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.138) (0.139) 
SkatteFUNN * below 4 mill 1.636*** 1.710*** 1.945*** 1.868*** 
 (0.141) (0.140) (0.148) (0.149) 
Observations 14831 14831 11748 11748 
Number of group(org_nr) 3264 3264 2243 2243 
R-squared 0.23 0.18 0.26 0.20 
This table corresponds to table 6.1. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include firm fixed effects. The last 
two columns are restricted to those who have ever used SkatteFUNN. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 6.10. Short term additionality of SkatteFUNN by pre SkatteFUNN R&D investment level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 3.284*** 5.297*** 5.752*** 5.339*** 
 (0.216) (0.249) (0.359) (0.627) 
Ln(sales) 0.288*** 0.229*** 0.213*** 0.264*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.037) (0.063) 
SkatteFUNN -0.439*** -0.427*** -0.317** -0.184 
 (0.166) (0.131) (0.157) (0.232) 
SkatteFUNN*below 4 mill 1.625*** 0.875*** 0.612*** 0.374 
 (0.174) (0.150) (0.194) (0.300) 
Post SkatteFUNN year -0.018 -0.015 0.021 0.091 
 (0.167) (0.132) (0.159) (0.234) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *below 4 mill 0.346** 0.050 -0.129 -0.356 
 (0.176) (0.152) (0.197) (0.303) 
Observations 11276 4966 2431 1031 
Number of group(org_nr) 2151 922 441 188 
R-squared 0.20 0.06 0.03 0.02 
Mean pre R&D <10 mill >1 mill,<10 mill >2 mill, <6 mill >3 mill, <5 mill 
Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include firm fixed effects.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.11. Short term additionality of SkatteFUNN by pre 
SkatteFUNN R&D investment level.  
 (1) 
ln(sales) 0.280*** 
 (0.022) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *(0-1 mill) 0.586*** 
 (0.150) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *(1-2 mill) 0.170 
 (0.179) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *(2-3 mill) -0.018 
 (0.227) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *(3-4 mill) -0.248 
 (0.274) 
Post SkatteFUNN year -0.019 
 (0.137) 
SkatteFUNN*(0-1 mill) 2.294*** 
 (0.148) 
SkatteFUNN *(1-2 mill) 1.244*** 
 (0.175) 
SkatteFUNN *(2-3 mill) 1.021*** 
 (0.224) 
SkatteFUNN *(3-4 mill) 0.870*** 
 (0.271) 
SkatteFUNN  -0.681*** 
 (0.135) 
Constant 3.470*** 
 (0.205) 
 Ord sample + ever used 
Observations 11748 
Number of group(org_nr) 2243 
R-squared 0.25 
Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All 
specifications include firm fixed effects.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
The findings from table 6.10 suggest that the 
additionality effects may differ with the “distance to 
the cap”. We explore this further in table 6.11, and the 
findings correspond well with the previous table. The 
large average additionality effect is largely driven by 
firms with low previous R&D investments, where a 
given increase in kroner corresponds to a large relative 
increase. However, this specification again highlights 
the problems created by the likely underreporting of 
R&D investments (after SkatteFUNN) to the tax 
authorities from large R&D performers. This poses a 
challenge for our difference-in-difference approach, 
overestimating the additionality effect for those below 
the cap, since the benchmark growth rate is not 
measured correctly. We therefore report the result 
from a slightly different exercise in table 6.12. Here we 
compare R&D investments for SkatteFUNN firms in 
years when they participate in SkatteFUNN to years 
when they do not participate, but SkatteFUNN exists. 
Compared to the specification used in most of this 
report, we then do not isolate the assumed common 
effect of self-selection into the scheme. (The estimate is 
a “difference”, not a “difference-in-difference”.) This 
probably biases the estimates upward. On the other 
hand, we do not rely on underreported R&D for the 
firms above the cap when we estimate the effect below 
the cap, which would also bias estimates upward. The 
estimated additionality for firms below the cap is 
smaller than what is found in table 6.11. 
 
 
Table 6.12: Short term additionality of SkatteFUNN by pre 
SkatteFUNN R&D investment level. “Difference 
approach” 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 3.490*** 5.771*** 
 (0.205) (0.360) 
ln(sales) 0.278*** 0.211*** 
 (0.022) (0.037) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *(0-1 mill) 0.567***  
 (0.063)  
Post SkatteFUNN year *(1-2 mill) 0.151  
 (0.115)  
Post SkatteFUNN year *(2-3 mill) -0.037 -0.021 
 (0.180) (0.146) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *(3-4 mill) -0.267 -0.257 
 (0.237) (0.191) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *(4-5 mill) 0.095 0.078 
 (0.287) (0.231) 
Post SkatteFUNN year *(5-6 mill) -0.090 -0.074 
 (0.271) (0.219) 
Post SkatteFUNN year * (more 
than 6 mill) 
-0.036 
(0.190) 
 
   
SkatteFUNN*(0-1 mill) 1.612***  
 (0.061)  
SkatteFUNN *(1-2 mill) 0.563***  
 (0.112)  
SkatteFUNN *(2-3 mill) 0.340* 0.354** 
 (0.179) (0.144) 
SkatteFUNN *(3-4 mill) 0.189 0.193 
 (0.234) (0.189) 
SkatteFUNN *(4-5 mill) -0.190 -0.161 
 (0.284) (0.229) 
SkatteFUNN *(5-6 mill) -0.503* -0.485** 
 (0.266) (0.214) 
SkatteFUNN * (more than 6 mill) -0.991***  
 (0.188)  
 Ord sample + ever 
used 
2-6 + ever 
used 
Observations 11748 2431 
Number of group(org_nr) 2243 441 
R-squared 0.26 0.04 
Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All 
specifications include firm fixed effects.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 6.13. Short term additionality results by data source for 
matched sample 
 All data from 
SkatteFUNN base 
All data from 
R&D survey 
Ln(sales) -0.240** -0.084 
 (0.097) (0.139) 
Post SkatteFUNN year -0.213 0.425** 
 (0.179) (0.198) 
Post SkatteFUNN year 
*below 4 mill 
0.516** 
(0.211) 
0.893*** 
(0.245) 
   
SkatteFUNN -0.741*** -0.525** 
 (0.176) (0.225) 
SkatteFUNN*below 4 mill 1.341*** 1.015*** 
 (0.208) (0.274) 
Constant 10.051*** 7.630*** 
 (1.090) (1.570) 
Observations 1873 1873 
Number of groups (org_nr) 489 489 
R-squared 0.14 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All 
specifications include firm fixed effects.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
As a final analysis, table 6.13 reports the results from 
regressions on the sample of firms that are both in the 
R&D survey-based sample used in section 6.1-6.4, and 
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in the sample based on the SkatteFUNN database in 
this section. In one of the specifications, all the 
variables are taken from the SkatteFUNN base, 
whereas the other only uses variables from the R&D 
surveys. As seen from the table, the two datasets yield 
quite similar, though far from identical results. The 
most striking difference is that the estimated 
“additionality effect” for firms below the cap is higher 
when we use R&D figures from the SkatteFUNN 
application as our measure of R&D. Again this could be 
due to the underreporting for the large firms as 
discussed above. Note that the sums of the coefficients 
for the SkatteFUNN and the SkatteFUNN*less than 4 
mill variables are quite similar across datasets. 
 
6.6. Effects of SkatteFUNN on employment 
and production reported in public 
registers 
What we have found so far is basically that firms report 
more R&D when they receive the tax credit. However, 
with a tax credit proportional to R&D spending, firms 
that receive a tax subsidy on their marginal R&D 
investment have an obvious incentive to include as 
many costs as possible in their R&D budgets. This 
incentive was not present before the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN. In theory, therefore, the increase in R&D 
investments we have estimated so far could simply 
reflect a change in firms’ way of reporting R&D – 
possibly legitimate, possibly illegitimate. Another 
possible mechanisms going in the same direction is 
that the tax credit increases the demand for 
researchers. If this demand is inelastic, the tax credit 
would mainly cause the wage of researchers to rise. 
Hence, real R&D costs would increase, but not real 
R&D efforts. 
 
If firms increase their true R&D efforts, it should be 
possible to observe this in firms’ labour productivity. 
R&D-activities are labour intensive, and typically, the 
returns to the investments materialize after the fiscal 
year when the R&D is undertaken. Therefore, either, 
labour inputs should increase for a given production 
level, or production should fall for a given labour 
input. 
 
Data on labour use and production (sales) can be 
extracted from administrative registers. These data are 
collected independent of firms’ reporting of R&D. If 
effects of the tax credit can be found in these numbers 
it would add significant credibility to our conclusion 
that the tax credit stimulates additional R&D. 
 
Based on individual register data from 1997-2004 we 
have constructed firm level measures of  
1. Total man-years 
2. Man-years with at least 12 years of education (High 
School Diploma) 
3. Man-years with at least 15 years of education 
(Bachelor)  
4. Man-years with at least 15 years of education 
(Bachelor) in engineering or natural science 
5. Man-years with at least 17 years of education 
(Master)  
 
We start out merging the employment and production 
data to the data used in chapter 6.1 and run variations 
over the following specification 
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Table 6.14. The effect of reported intramural R&D on BSc man-
years 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ln(sales) 0,364*** 0,363*** 0,364*** 
 (0,052) (0,052) (0,052) 
ln(Intramural R&D) 0,008*** 0,008*** 0,003 
 (0,003) (0,003) (0,006) 
ln(Intramural R&D) * below 4 
mill 
  0,006 
(0,007) 
ln(Intramural R&D) * 
SkatteFUNN 
 0,002 
(0,003) 
0,003 
(0,004) 
ln(Intramural R&D) * 
SkatteFUNN * below 4 mill 
   -0,001 
(0,005) 
Adj.R-sq (within) 0,21 0,21 0,21 
No. of obs. 5787 5787 5787 
The dependent variable is ln(man-years with at least three years of higher 
education). All specifications include firm fixed effects. SkatteFUNN is a dummy 
variable for receiving the R&D tax credit. “below 4 mill” is a dummy variable for 
on average to invest less than 4 mill NOK in real R&D prior to the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN in 2002. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6.15. The effect of reported R&D man years on man-years 
by education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Edu 12 Tech. 
edu 15 
Edu 17 
ln(sales) 0,404*** 0,396*** 0,382*** 0,345*** 
 (0,060) (0,058) (0,058) (0,056) 
ln(Intramural R&D) 0,003 0,002 0,007 0,012* 
 (0,008) (0,007) (0,008) (0,007) 
ln(Intramural R&D) 
* below 4 mill 
0,000 
(0,009) 
0,002 
(0,008) 
0,002 
(0,009) 
-0,005 
(0,008) 
ln(Intramural R&D) 
* SkatteFUNN 
0,005 
(0,004) 
0,003 
(0,004) 
0,005 
(0,005) 
0,008 
(0,005) 
ln(Intramural R&D) 
* SkatteFUNN * 
below 4 mill 
-0,004 
(0,005) 
-0,003 
(0,005) 
-0,002 
(0,006) 
-0,009 
(0,006) 
Adj.R-sq (within) 0,27 0,28 0,20 0,15 
No. of obs. 5929 5923 5266 5344 
All specifications include firm fixed effects. SkatteFUNN is a dummy variable for 
receiving the R&D tax credit. “below 4 mill” is a dummy variable for on average 
to invest less than 4 mill NOK in real R&D prior to the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN in 2002. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Note that we use man years with at least three years of 
higher education (equivalent to a BSc degree) as most 
of the man years spend on R&D fall into this category. 
We check the robustness with respect to this choice in 
table 6.15. 
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Table 6.16. The effect of reported R&D on man-years, by education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
 All Edu 12 Edu 15 Edu 17 Tech. edu 15 
ln(sales) 0.2467*** 0.2271*** 0.2183*** 0.1680*** 0.1775*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0087) (0.0078) 
ln (Intramural R&D) 0.0177*** 0.0194*** 0.0173*** 0.0105*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0029) 
ln(Intramural R&D) -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0025 -0.0051 0.0015 
* Post SkatteFUNN year (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0037) 
ln (Intramural R&D) 0.0041 0.0043 0.0061 0.0044 0.0054 
 * Post SkatteFUNN year 
 * below 4 mill 
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0042) 
ln(Intramural R&D)  0.0063 0.0074* 0.0098** 0.0060 0.0082** 
* SkatteFUNN (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0040) 
ln (Intramural R&D)  -0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0043 -0.0035 -0.0054 
 * SkatteFUNN*below 4 mill (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0045) 
Constant 0.0268 -0.1609** -0.6690*** -0.5997*** -0.6050*** 
 (0.0618) (0.0628) (0.0715) (0.0858) (0.0779) 
Observations 11755 11576 10538 8378 8363 
Number of firms 2994 2961 2751 2347 2231 
R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.11 
All specifications include firm fixed effects. SkatteFUNN is a dummy variable for receiving the R&D tax credit. “below 4 mill” is a dummy variable for on average to 
invest less than 4 mill NOK in real R&D prior to the introduction of SkatteFUNN in 2002. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level   ** Significant at the 5 percent level    *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Our methodology depends critically on the ability of our 
data to produce a significant coefficient on β in (6.4). 
Table 6.14, column (1), shows that we pass this test. 
Intramural R&D as reported in the R&D surveys does 
increase the use of BSc-educated labour for a given 
production level as reported in administrative registers. 
 
The next question we ask is whether this relationship is 
weaker for firms receiving an R&D tax credit than for 
other firms. Recall from table 6.2, column (3) and (4) 
that participation in the tax credit scheme did increase 
reported R&D man-years. If the effect of reported R&D 
man-years on labour input is smaller for SkatteFUNN 
firms, it would suggest that some of the reported 
increase in R&D represents a shift in reporting 
behaviour rather than increased R&D efforts. 
 
From column (2) we see that this is not the case. On the 
contrary, the estimated effect for SkatteFUNN firms is 
slightly larger than for non-participating firms and for 
firms prior to the introduction of the scheme. This is 
somewhat surprising. One interpretation is that 
SkatteFUNN has caused a more conservative definition 
of R&D man-years, e.g. by excluding R&D support 
personnel from the figures13. Another interpretation is 
that SkatteFUNN has increased the awareness of R&D as 
a separate activity in the firm and thereby increased the 
data quality in the R&D surveys. In the reported 
specification, the effect is not significant however, hence 
one should not put to much emphasis on the finding. 
 
Only firms that receive subsidies on the margin have an 
incentive to exaggerate their R&D activities. In column 
(3) we interact R&D man-years with a dummy for being 
below the 4 million cap. We find that firms below the 
cap have a slightly lower coefficient, but the effect is far 
                                                     
13 R&D support personnel are supposed to be included in the R&D 
surveys, but not in the SkatteFUNN applications. It is, however, 
plausible that some firms will use the figures from their SkatteFUNN 
applications when answering the R&D survey. 
from significant. The results in table 6.14, therefore, 
suggest that SkatteFUNN has real effects on the R&D 
man-years. 
 
Next, we investigate the robustness of this finding by 
changing our left hand side labour measure. The results 
are reported in table 6.15. We see that the results are in 
line with the effects found in table 6.14, column (3).  
 
Results based on R&D from the SkatteFUNN 
database 
Here, we report the results from an analysis similar to 
the analysis above, but we extend the sample by using 
the R&D information reported by the firms in the 
SkatteFUNN application. In this way we can get a 
sample that is far more representative, cf. chapter 6.5. 
The specification is similar to the one used above, but 
we use intramural R&D from the SkatteFUNN 
application and tax authorities as our measure of R&D. 
The results are qualitatively in line with those reported 
above: Increased R&D activities give higher employment 
relative to sales in the same year. This also applies to 
SkatteFUNN firms, both above and below the cap.  
 
6.7. Heterogeneity in the degree of 
additionality 
We saw in section 6.5 that the degree of additionality 
for firms below the 4 million cap appears to vary 
between firms according to the level of their prior 
R&D-investments. Firms that had low levels of R&D 
seem to have responded most strongly to the R&D tax 
incentives.14 Obviously, the degree of additionality 
may also vary systematically between firms that differ 
along other dimensions. In this section, we investigate 
whether the degree of additionality varies by firm size, 
location, industry and skill intensity. 
                                                     
14 Recall, however, that additionality is measured by growth in R&D 
investments, hence for firms with a low pre SkatteFUNN level of 
R&D it does not take a very large R&D investment do produce a high 
growth rate, while the scope for negative growth is limited. 
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Table 6.17. Short term additionality by size and location 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Small Medium Large Rural Urban 
ln(sales) 0,412 0,522*** 0,268** 0,505*** 0,297** 
 (0,280) (0,177) (0,136) (0,189) (0,126) 
ln(direct subsidies) 0,331*** 0,365*** 0,377*** 0,433*** 0,338*** 
 (0,050) (0,039) (0,029) (0,037) (0,026) 
Post SkatteFUNN year -0,798 -0,506 -0,871*** 0,115 -0,939*** 
 (0,647) (0,593) (0,244) (0,391) (0,242) 
Post SkatteFUNN year * below 4 mill -0,715 -0,265 0,896*** -0,369 0,478 
 (0,713) (0,639) (0,302) (0,453) (0,292) 
SkatteFUNN 1,136* 1,169** 1,342*** 0,706* 1,340*** 
 (0,663) (0,521) (0,254) (0,393) (0,233) 
SkatteFUNN * below 4 mill 1,954** 1,799*** 1,333*** 2,008*** 1,363*** 
 (0,758) (0,581) (0,333) (0,477) (0,294) 
Constant term 1,192 -0,912 1,342 -1,547 1,546 
 (2,670) (1,887) (1,714) (2,107) (1,465) 
Adj R-sq (within) 0,168 0,136 0,108 0,168 0,100 
No. of obs. 1463 2340 4430 2240 5993 
No. of SkatteFUNN firms 260 435 457 358 794 
No. of SkatteFUNN firms below 4 mill 207 320 292 291 528 
Sample means:      
Employees 16 50 269 101 182 
R&D man-years 2.3 3.0 3.6 2.1 3.6 
R&D intensity 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.06 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include firm fixed.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6.18. Short term additionality by industry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Lowtech Hightech Manufacturing Services Other 
ln(sales)  0,270**  0,542**  0,461***  0,406** -0,092 
 (0,124) (0,250) (0,178) (0,191) (0,313) 
ln(direct subsidies)  0,446***  0,209***  0,351***  0,377***  0,437*** 
 (0,028) (0,028) (0,026) (0,044) (0,084) 
Post SkatteFUNN year -0,734*** -0,904** -0,637**  -0,967** -0,986* 
 (0,255) (0,393) (0,271) (0,423) (0,560) 
Post SkatteFUNN year * below 4 mill  0,341  0,585  0,526* -0,206  0,341 
 (0,295) (0,514) (0,317) (0,513) (0,668) 
SkatteFUNN  1,256***  1,239***  1,164***  1,392***  1,615*** 
 (0,287) (0,350) (0,277) (0,386) (0,581) 
SkatteFUNN * below 4 mill  1,624***  1,019**  1,436***  1,396***  0,792 
 (0,339) (0,463) (0,327) (0,501) (0,829) 
Constant term  1,085  0,111 -0,594  0,576  5,251 
 (1,457) (2,740) (2,066) (2,118) (3,882) 
Adj R-sq (within)  0,129  0,091  0,128  0,111  0,098 
No. of obs. 5900 2333 5236 2251 746 
No. of SkatteFUNN firms 655 497 784 307 61 
No. of SkatteFUNN firms below 4 mill 508 311 601 182 36 
Sample means:      
Employees 189 88 145 156 283 
R&D man-years 2.2 5.7 3.1 3.9 1.7 
R&D intensity 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.04 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include firm fixed.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Our point of departure is the sample and specification 
used in table 6.2, column (2). For simplicity, we have 
exchanged the set of year dummies with a single 
dummy distinguishing between pre and post 
SkatteFUNN years. 
 
In table 6.17, column (1)-(3) we split the sample accord-
ing to firm size. Column (1) and (2) include small and 
medium sized firms. We use the SMB definition laid out 
in the SkatteFUNN 2002 rules. According to these rules a 
firm is defined as an SMB if at least two out of the 
following three criteria are fulfilled: (i) Less than 100 
employees (i) Less than 80 million NOK in sales (iii) Less 
than 40 million NOK in total assets. Since our regression 
model includes fixed effects, we want firms to stay in the 
same size category in all years. We have therefore de-
flated all values to 2002 NOK and classified the firms 
according to their mean employment, sales and assets. 
Within the SMB group small firms are defined as firms 
with mean employment less than 20. The result for this 
group is reported in column (1). We see from the table 
that the degree of additionality varies systematically by 
firm size. Small firms have the highest degree of add-
itionality. From the bottom of table 6.17 we see that 
small firms have a somewhat lower level of R&D invest-
ments than large firms, but the difference are not large 
Input additionality in the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme Reports 2007/47 
42 
compared to the difference in number of employees. It is 
likely, but not entirely obvious, that the difference 
between small and large firms in table 6.17 are driven by 
the level effects discussed above in relation with section 
6.5. In any case, our finding in table 6.17 fits well with 
our descriptive results in section 5.4 showing that the 
actual subsidy share – and thereby the strength of the 
incentive – falls with the firm number of employees. 
 
In table 6.17, column (4) and (5), we split the sample 
according to location. Rural firms are defined as firms 
situated in municipalities that have had arrangements 
for general labour and investments subsidies. We see 
that the additionality is larger for rural firms. Looking 
at the firm characteristics at the bottom of the table, 
however, this is most likely driven by rural firms being 
both smaller and less R&D intensive. 
 
In table 6.18 we explore whether the degree of 
additionality vary between industries. We make two 
broad categorizations. In column (1) and (2) we 
distinguish between “lowtech” and “high-tech” 
industries. We classify the following industries as high 
tech: Chemicals, machinery and equipment, computers, 
electronics, scientific instruments, computer services and 
R&D services.15 The classification is inspired by OECD 
and expanded by looking at average industry R&D 
intensity in the sample. We find that the degree of 
additionality is highest for low-tech firms. Note that 
average number of employees in this category is more 
than twice the number of employees for high-tech firms. 
Average R&D man-years is however far lower, and this 
is probably the main driving factor. 
 
Table 6.18, column (3)-(5) split the sample in 
manufacturing firms, service firms and firms in other 
industries. We see that manufacturing firms and 
service firms are very similar with respect to 
additionality, while the estimated additionality in other 
firms is lower and non-significant. The latter results 
should probably not be emphasized as the sample size 
is small with only 61 SkatteFUNN firms included. 
 
The final firm characteristic we explore is skill intensity 
defined as the share of workers in each firm with 
higher education. We use the average over all years a 
firm is observed. We classify firms with a share below 
50 % as having a low skill intensity (relative to other 
SkatteFUNN firms), firms with a share between 50 % 
and 75 % as having a medium skill intensity and firms 
with a share above 75 % as having a high skill 
intensity. We see that the degree of additionality is 
highest for firms with low skill intensity, but again, the 
pattern follows the average level of R&D man-years. 
 
                                                     
15 The names used are abbreviated. The exact NACE codes included 
are: 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 72 and 73. 
6.8. Can the assessment of additionality by 
firms and bureaucrats be trusted? 
As pointed out in our descriptive analysis, the 
SkatteFUNN data include the firms own assessment of 
project additionality as well as the assessment made by 
Innovation Norway. It is of great interest to see 
whether these assessments correspond with our 
econometric analysis. In order to do so we use the 
same sample and basic specification as in the 
heterogeneity analysis in section 6.7, but now we want 
to explore whether the degree of additionality vary 
according to the firms’ self assessment and the 
assessment by Innovation Norway. This is done in table 
6.20, column (1) and (2) respecttively. All projects 
contain the assessment of Innovation Norway, while 
there are a lot of missing data with respect to firms’ 
self assessment. Firms are asked about their self 
assessment both in the application and in the end 
report. To reduce the problem of missing data, we have 
combined these sources.16  
 
The dummy variables for “Post SkatteFUNN year* 
below 4 million”, “SkatteFUNN” and 
“SkatteFUNN*below 4 million” are exchanged with a 
set of variables distinguishing between projects with 
low assessed additionality, medium assessed 
additionality and high assessed additionality. In 
addition we control for whether the firm in the end 
received a tax credit or not. Starting out with the 
assessment of Innovation Norway in column (2), we 
find that estimated additionality increases with the 
score they give on additionality.17 It is hard to evaluate 
whether the magnitude of the effects are satisfactorily, 
but the pattern clearly give some credibility both to the 
way the SkatteFUNN applications are assessed and to 
the ability of our regressions to measure additionality.  
 
Results regarding the firms’ self assessment are 
reported in column (1). The way firms are asked about 
additionality differs from how Innovation Norway 
makes their assessment, and it is slightly more difficult 
to classify the answers in low, medium and high. The 
reason for this is that there is a time dimension in the 
answers. Projects may be postponed, and hence there 
is a possible issue with short term vs long term 
additionality. Our estimates do not suggest any 
difference between low and medium additionality, but 
projects that the firms claim to have high additionality 
do indeed seem to be associated with higher growth in 
R&D investments. Our difficulty with the classification 
                                                     
16 When both scores are available we use the mean of the two scores, 
otherwise we use the one that is not missing. 
17 Each project is given a score from 1 to 7. If a firm has several 
projects, we aggregate these using their total budget as weights. We 
group score 1 and 2 into the category low additionality. Score 3 and 
4 constitute in our analysis medium additionality and score 5, 6 and 
7 are classified as high additionality. Relatively few projects have 6 
or 7, and in more detailed analyses we cannot estimate higher 
additionality for projects with these scores than for projects with 
score 5. 
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regards where to draw the line between full and 
medium additionality. The estimation result is 
therefore somewhat surprising. What the numbers tell 
us is that there is no difference between firms that 
plainly state that a subsidy would not affect them (low 
additionality – score 1) and those who state that the 
project would have been scaled down or postponed 
without the subsidy (medium additionality –score 2 
and 3). Those who state that the project would have 
been put off or “put on hole” (score 4 and 5), however, 
seem to have higher growth in their R&D investments 
than the others. Hence, there seems to be some truth in 
self assessments. Given that Hervik et al (2006) for 
many years have evaluated the subsidy programs of the 
Research Council and Innovation Norway based on 
firms’ self assessment, another result would have been 
rather disturbing. 
 
Finally, we may note that firms that applied, but in the 
end did not receive a tax credit, have lower R&D 
growth than others. This is to be expected. 
 
 
Table 6.19. Short term additionality by skill intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Low Medium High 
ln(sales) 0,551***  0,383**   0,131 
 (0,209) (0,192) (0,144) 
ln(direct subsidies) 0,439*** 0,349*** 0,314*** 
 (0,041) (0,036) (0,036) 
Post SkatteFUNN year -0,594 -0,844*** -0,851** 
 (0,543) (0,317) (0,348) 
Post SkatteFUNN year * below 4 mill  0,458  0,366  0,106 
 (0,582) (0,388) (0,460) 
SkatteFUNN  0,660 1,447*** 1,391*** 
 (0,483) (0,358) (0,300) 
SkatteFUNN * below 4 mill 1,979*** 1,506*** 1,132*** 
 (0,535) (0,431) (0,433) 
Constant term -2,247  0,157  4,082** 
 (2,443) (2,267) (1,598) 
Adj R-sq (within)  0,133  0,120  0,096 
No. of obs. 3003 2760 2093 
No. of SkatteFUNN firms 357 376 418 
No. of SkatteFUNN firms below 4 mill 317 271 230 
Sample means:    
Employees 163 209 105 
R&D man-years 2.1 3.1 4.8 
R&D intensity 0.02 0.03 0.13 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include firm fixed.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
Table 6.20. R&D growth and assessment of additionality by firms and bureaucrats 
 (1) (2) 
 Assessment by the firm Assessment by Innovation Norway 
ln(sales)  0,318***  0,323*** 
 (0,110) (0,109) 
ln(direct subsidies)  0,386***  0,384*** 
 (0,022) (0,022) 
Post SkatteFUNN year -0,592*** -0,597*** 
 (0,118) (0,117) 
Applicant with low additionality  2,492***  2,122*** 
 (0,236) (0,203) 
Applicant with medium additionality  2,377***  2,462*** 
 (0,151) (0,148) 
Applicant with high additionality  2,782***  2,650*** 
 (0,235) (0,216) 
Tax credit redjected -1,134*** -1,201*** 
 (0,262) (0,228) 
Constant term  1,052  1,007 
 (1,265) (1,257) 
Adj R-sq (within)  0,110  0,113 
No. of obs. 8036 8182 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include firm fixed.effects.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 6.21. Short term additionality for R&D bought from universities and research institutes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Internal R&D Total R&D Total R&D R&D bought 
from research 
institutions 
Other 
cooperative R&D 
Cap 4 million 8 million 8 million 8 million 8 million 
ln(sales)  0,389***  0,464***  0,464***  0,249***  0,412*** 
 (0,120) (0,116) (0,116) (0,081) (0,089) 
Dummy for 1995  0,480**  0,595***  0,596***  0,105  0,130 
 (0,197) (0,202) (0,203) (0,135) (0,172) 
Dummy for 1997  0,387*  0,444*  0,445*  0,321**  -0,510** 
 (0,228) (0,234) (0,234) (0,157) (0,202) 
Dummy for 1999 -0,214 -0,177 -0,177  0,048 -0,414** 
 (0,231) (0,237) (0,237) (0,152) (0,199) 
Dummy for 2001  0,878***  0,894***  0,896*** -0,065 -0,257 
 (0,230) (0,235) (0,235) (0,154) (0,192) 
Dummy for 2002 -0,316 -0,522* -0,521* -0,787**  -1,050*** 
 (0,292) (0,308) (0,308) (0,314) (0,341) 
Dummy for 2003 -0,656** -0,812** -0,811** -0,783**  -1,215*** 
 (0,316) (0,325) (0,325) (0,314) (0,351) 
Dummy for 2004 -0,905*** -1,018*** -1,018*** -0,885*** -1,172*** 
 (0,314) (0,322) (0,322) (0,318) (0,349) 
Dummy for 2005 -1,051*** -1,162*** -1,163*** -1,012*** -1,522*** 
 (0,322) (0,330) (0,330) (0,321) (0,347) 
Post SkatteFUNN year * below cap  0,477*  0,647**  0,647**  0,567**   0,615** 
 (0,261) (0,281) (0,281) (0,283) (0,303) 
SkatteFUNN  1,283***  1,300***  1,301***  0,433  0,541 
 (0,212) (0,251) (0,251) (0,315) (0,409) 
SkatteFUNN * below cap  1,550***  1,237***  1,297***  0,170  0,413 
 (0,251) (0,281) (0,286) (0,336) (0,437) 
SkatteFUNN * below cap * research institute   -0,220   
   (0,181)   
Constant  0,375 -0,207 -0,213 -1,572* -2,287** 
 (1,350) (1,314) (1,313) (0,919) (1,013) 
Adj R-sq (within)  0,077  0,071  0,071  0,020  0,021 
No. of obs. 8390 8390 8390 8363 8344 
UR is a dummy for reporting R&D bought from universities and research institutes. All specifications include firm fixed.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
6.9. More on the incentive to do cooperative 
R&D with universities and research 
institutes 
In section 6.4 we analyzed the probability to start or 
continue extramural R&D done in cooperation with 
universities, colleges and research institutes. We found 
only weak evidence that the probability to start such 
R&D had increased after the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN, and no evidence to suggest that the 
probability to continue such R&D had increased. 
 
In this section we analyze this question in some more 
detail. The results are reported in table 6.21. Our point 
of departure is the specification in table 6.2, column 
(2). However, we cannot control for direct grants used 
to finance cooperative R&D because such data is not 
available for all years. We therefore start out 
estimating the effect of SkatteFUNN on intramural 
R&D without controlling for direct grants. We see that 
leaving out this control has little effect on the 
coefficients of interest. The estimated additionality 
becomes slightly higher, 1.550 rather than 1.331 in 
table 6.2 column (2). Next, we want to include 
extramural R&D in our analysis. The relevant cap is 
then 8 million, as all firms that would do less than 8 
million in total R&D in absence of the SkatteFUNN 
scheme have an incentive to increase their R&D by 
buying R&D services from research institutions. We see 
that the estimated additionality for total R&D is 
smaller than for intramural R&D suggesting that the 
effect of SkatteFUNN on extramural R&D has not been 
as large as on intramural R&D. Keep in mind, however, 
that the estimated effect on intramural R&D is quite 
large. Moreover, the difference between the two 
estimates is not statistically significant, and the control 
group becomes relatively small when the relevant cap 
is 8 million. There are 1276 firm-year observations in 
the sample, with average R&D prior to SkatteFUNN 
above 8 million. 213 of these have received a tax 
credit. 
 
In column (3) we expand the specification in column 
(2) by looking at the interaction between being a 
SkatteFUNN firm below the 8 million cap with actually 
receiving support for buying R&D from research 
institutions. We see that the increase in total R&D is 
not higher for those who use this opportunity to 
receive an extra tax credit than for those who do not 
use this opportunity18.  
                                                     
18 Interacting the dummy for buying R&D from a research institution 
with more variables does not change this result. 
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Table 6.22. Effects of R&D subsidies on firm average annual wage for R&D personnel 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All firms SMBs  Large firms 
Sales per R&D man year/1000  0,024  0,400*  0,023 
 (0,017) (0,233) (0,017) 
Direct subsidies per R&D man year  0,095**  0,168***  0,052 
 (0,042) (0,059) (0,041) 
Tax credit per R&D man year  0,328***  0,528***  0,130 
 (0,087) (0,174) (0,095) 
Dummy for 1995  0,226  0,306 -1,577 
 (15,265) (22,347) (20,193) 
Dummy for 1997 22,813 26,790 21,757 
 (17,985) (29,073) (22,553) 
Dummy for 1999  9,881 28,443 -0,952 
 (17,510) (26,569) (22,377) 
Dummy for 2001 22,922 27,258 20,963 
 (17,833) (27,204) (22,914) 
Dummy for 2002 26,512 22,436 20,339 
 (20,367) (32,785) (25,182) 
Dummy for 2003 29,116 39,754 20,545 
 (18,853) (31,819) (24,227) 
Dummy for 2004 -8,419 -19,432  5,273 
 (17,771) (31,772) (21,868) 
Dummy for 2005 -6,282 -7,103 -0,202 
 (18,483) (30,760) (23,603) 
Constant 530,212*** 475,283*** 561,148*** 
 (13,606) (22,501) (17,424) 
Adj R-sq (within)  0,034  0,108  0,008 
No. of obs. 5700 2776 2924 
All specifications include firm fixed. Firms that report zero R&D wage costs or zero R&D man-years are excluded from the sample.See section 6.7 for a definition of firm 
sizes. 
Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
In the next two columns we split extramural R&D in 
R&D bought from research institutions and other 
cooperative R&D, that is R&D services bought from 
other firms or research institutions not approved by 
SkatteFUNN. SkatteFUNN should increase the 
incentive to buy R&D from approved research 
institutions, and have no direct effect on the incentive 
to do other cooperative R&D. There could, however, be 
a negative indirect effect as firms may choose to 
substitute away from R&D that is not covered by 
SkatteFUNN.19 We see that both effects are positive, 
but not significant. Moreover, the estimated effect on 
R&D bought from research institutions is smaller than 
the effect on other cooperative R&D. Hence, the data 
do not suggest that SkatteFUNN has had a strong 
impact on the incentive to do extramural R&D in 
cooperation with universities, colleges and research 
institutes. This is somewhat puzzling as for most firms 
the marginal price on such R&D has been lowered. 
Partly the negative result may be due to the control 
group of firms above the 8 million cap being very 
small. Recall from chapter 4 that only 0.5% of all 11 
144 firm year observations with a positive R&D tax 
credit reached the cap for total R&D while 30 % 
actually received a tax credit for extramural R&D. 
 
                                                     
19 In principle there could also be an indirect positive effect if other 
cooperative R&D projects are strongly complementary to R&D 
covered by SkatteFUNN.  
6.10. Effects of SkatteFUNN on the wage for 
R&D personnel  
With a limited supply of R&D workers in the short run, 
one runs the risk that R&D subsidies will increase R&D 
wages rather than R&D man-years. Using US data, 
Goolsbee (1998) provides evidence of such an effect, 
and OECD (2007) in their recent Economic Survey has 
pointed to this as a main concern when discussing 
Norwegian R&D policy. Register data, i.e. data with 
wages for individual workers will be more suitable for 
analyzing this question than the data used for this 
evaluation project. However, the data at hand lend 
themselves easily to a first look. In the R&D surveys 
firms both report the total wage bill for R&D personnel 
and the R&D man-years. This allows us to calculate the 
firm average annual wage for R&D personnel. The 
calculated mean is 252 000 NOK (2003 values) with a 
standard deviation of 127 000. This seems somewhat 
low, but the level is not central to our analysis. 
 
In table 6.22 we regress firm average annual wages for 
R&D personnel on sales per R&D man year, direct R&D 
subsidies per R&D man year, the R&D tax credit per 
R&D man year, year dummies and firm fixed effects. 
The estimated wage effects of subsidies are rather 
substantial. If a firm receives 100 000 in direct 
subsidies per R&D man year, each R&D worker receive 
about 10 000 as a wage increase. If a firm receives 
100 000 in tax credit per R&D man year, each R&D 
worker receive about 33 000 as a wage increase. From 
column (2) and (3) we see that the estimated effects 
are driven by small- and medium-sized firms. For this 
group, the estimated wage increase is 17 000 per 
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100 000 in direct subsidies and 53 000 per 100 000 in 
tax credit. Note, however, that R&D wages in SMBs are 
also far more responsive to sales than R&D wages in 
large firms. 
 
These results are suggestive, but before jumping to 
conclusions we should note that the effects are likely to 
be severely biased by measurement errors in the R&D 
man year variable. Since this is used in the 
denominator both at the left hand side variable and in 
several of the right hand side variables it introduces a 
spurious correlation. If e.g. reported R&D man-years 
are too small, the average annual R&D wage will be 
too large. Sales, direct subsidies and tax credits per 
R&D man year will also be too large, and this will 
cause a positive bias in their coefficients. The much 
larger effect of the tax credit as compared to direct 
subsidies is still intriguing, and warrant further 
research. 
 
Finally, we should mention that some increase in R&D 
wages as a result of R&D subsidies is to be expected if 
R&D subsidies is efficient in rising R&D investments. 
These higher wages will help attract more researchers 
in the long run, which is necessary if total R&D efforts 
are to increase. Remember also that we did find a 
positive effect of the R&D tax credit on R&D man-years 
in table 6.4. If the supply of R&D workers is very 
inelastic, however, or if existing R&D workers are able 
to get hold of a substantial part of the subsidies as a 
rent, R&D subsidies will be a rather inefficient policy. 
 
6.11. Bang for the buck? How much additional 
R&D per krone tax receipt forgone? 
So far our main focus has been on whether the R&D 
tax credit scheme has stimulated additional R&D 
investments. Although our estimated results are mainly 
driven by firms that did very little R&D prior to 
SkatteFUNN, and they are sensitive to sample 
restrictions and model specifications, the evidence we 
have produced suggest that SkatteFUNN has 
stimulated additional R&D investments. This is to be 
expected when the price of R&D is reduced. 
Establishing this, however, is not enough to conclude 
that the scheme is successful. The key question is how 
much additional R&D has been induced per krone spent 
on the scheme. This ratio is in some previous studies 
known as “bang for the buck” or even just BFTB – a 
somewhat amusing terminology we chose to adopt.20 
Estimating how much additional R&D the scheme has 
induced is obviously far more challenging than 
estimating whether the effect is positive or not. Our 
strategy will be to produce estimates based on different 
models and assumptions in order to see whether 
different approaches will produce numbers of similar 
magnitude. However, we again stress that these 
different numbers do not represent independent 
                                                     
20 Our source of inspiration is de Jong  and Verhoeven (2007). 
estimates of the BFTB, since they rely on different 
representations of partly the same data, and the same 
fundamental identification problem applies in all 
approaches, since it is an inherent characteristic of the 
scheme itself 
 
Before presenting the actual estimates, let us notice 
that a project that would not have been undertaken at 
all without the R&D tax credit will have a BFTB of 
1/0.20=5 if an SME and 1/0.18=5.56 if not an SME. 
A project that would have been undertaken in full 
without the tax credit will have a BFTB of zero. So, any 
BFTB less than five implies that there is a “deadweight 
loss”, i.e. that tax support is given to some R&D that 
would have been undertaken anyway. Typically, a 
BFTB of 1 or slightly more is considered acceptable. 
That implies that money spent on the R&D tax credit 
increase private R&D investments krone by krone. In 
absence of a cap, and with a 20 % tax credit, a BFTB 
=1, demands that firms respond to the R&D tax credit 
by a 25 % increase in their R&D spending.  
 
BFTB based on self-reported additionality 
A first estimate for BFTB can be calculated from the ex 
post self-reported additionality in the SkatteFUNN final 
project reports, cf. section 5.5. Here, firms are asked 
what would have happened to the project without 
support from SkatteFUNN. To each of the alternative 
answers we attach an “additionality factor”, saying 
how large fraction of the reported R&D that we assume 
to be a result of the tax credit. These factors are 
admittedly set somewhat arbitrarily, except for the 
alternatives “Carried out at the same scale and time 
horizon” and “Dropped”, where the natural 
additionality factors are zero and one, respectively. We 
therefore experiment with three different sets of 
additionality factors.  
 
The additional R&D generated from a SkatteFUNN 
project is then calculated as the R&D reported to the 
tax authorities (censored at NOK 10 mill) multiplied by 
the additionality factor. Summing this over all firms an 
BFTB is then calculated as the sum of the additional 
R&D across firms, divided by the total tax credit for the 
same firms. Using set A of additionality factors yields a 
BFTB of 2.65, the more “conservative” set B gives 2.12, 
while set C gives 2.64, showing that how the “do not 
know” category is treated has only minor implications 
for the results. 
 
 
Table 6.23. Assumptions on “additionality factors” 
 Additionality factor 
 A B C
Carried out at the same scale and 
time horizon 
0 0 0
Carried out at the same scale, but 
over a longer time horizon 
0.25 0.2 0.25
Limited scale 0.5 0.4 0.5
Postponed 0.75 0.6 0.75
Dropped 1 1 1
Do not know 0.5 0 dropped
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BFTB based on data from the R&D survey 
Recall equation 6.3, the specification behind table 6.2, 
column (1): 
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Here β gives us the change in log R&D induced by a 
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Our estimate for β is 1.282. Taking the model at face 
value, the expected R&D investment in absence of the 
scheme for firms below the cap participating in the 
scheme, is then their observed R&D under the scheme 
divided by exp(β)=3.60. Calculating this 
counterfactual R&D for all firms in the sample below 
the cap participating in the scheme and summarizing 
the difference between this and each firms’ observed 
R&D investment we get NOK 1 729 846 000. Next, 
summarizing the R&D tax credit received by all firms 
in the sample, both firms above and below the cap, we 
get 595 895 000. The ratio of these two numbers, 2.90 
gives us an estimate for the “BFTB” for the firms in our 
sample. Apparently, then, each krone tax receipt 
forgone has induced 2.90 kroner additional R&D. 
Recall, however, that the β -estimate is very uncertain, 
cf. chapter 6.1, and also that the sample used in the 
main regression is not representative for the true 
composition of firms participating in the scheme, cf. 
chapter 4. 
 
BFTB based on data from the SkatteFUNN 
applications 
Table 6.12 suggested that the effect of SkatteFUNN 
varied substantially between large and small R&D 
performers, and taking account of this should give us a 
more reliable BFTB. Furthermore, the estimates in 
table 6.12 were based on the actual population of 
SkatteFUNN firms. Obviously, this is also beneficial 
when estimating BFTB, although the drawbacks related 
to the SkatteFUNN data discussed in chapter 6.5 
should be kept in mind. 
 
Estimating the expected R&D investments in absence 
of SkatteFUNN (based on the estimates in table 6.12 
(column 1) and summarizing the difference between 
these numbers and the actual R&D investments in the 
same manner as above, we find that the additional 
R&D induced by SkatteFUNN amounts to NOK 3 170 
250 000 . Total R&D tax credits awarded to the firms 
in the sample sum to NOK 2 488 312 000, hence we 
get a BFTB of 1.27. The sample does not include firms 
that did not do R&D prior to the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN. Adding R&D done by these firms and 
making use of their self reported additionality, in 
absence of an econometric estimate, brings the BFTB to 
1.51 
 
BFTB based on estimates from a companion 
report Hægeland and Møen (2007) 
In a companion report “The relationship between the 
Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme and other 
innovation policy instruments” (Hægeland and Møen, 
2007) we estimate the additionality of the R&D tax 
credit and other R&D subsidies simultaneously using a 
linear specification taken from the literature on the 
additionality of direct R&D grants. In the main 
speficiation reported in table 5.3, column (1) we find 
that each krone tax credit induce 2.55 krone additional 
R&D for firms below the cap. Firms below the cap in 
the sample receive 357 059 in tax credit while firms 
above the cap receive 196 558. This gives a BFTB 
estimate of (2.55* 357 059)/(357 059 + 196 558) = 
1.64. The sample is based on observations in the R&D 
surveys. Assuming that the coefficient is valid for the 
sample of SkattFUNN firms used in the estimations 
based on the SkatteFUNN database, we get a BFTB of 
1.99. 
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The Norwegian R&D tax credit was introduced with 
the goal to increase innovation and creation of values 
in trade and industry, and to improve R&D efforts. The 
degree of input additionality, i.e. to what extent the 
scheme induces firms to invest more in R&D than they 
otherwise would have done, is obviously important 
when evaluating the overall efficiency of the scheme. 
Data for aggregate R&D investments in Norway 
suggest that the scheme has not achieved what the 
government aimed for. However, the scheme is not 
designed for large firms driving the development of 
aggregate R&D investments, and it is possible that R&D 
investments would have been still lower in absence of 
the scheme. Hence, a counterfactual analysis using 
firm level data is called for. 
 
Using firm level data, we find that firms receiving the 
R&D tax credit have stronger growth in their R&D 
investments than firms not receiving an R&D tax 
credit. Obviously, this may be driven by selection. 
Since the scheme is universal, it is very challenging to 
construct a valid control group. The most promising 
identification strategy is to compare applicant firms 
that previously have invested less than the cap with 
applicant firms that previously have invested more 
than this cap. R&D investments are fairly stable, and 
the latter group should not have a strong incentive to 
increase their R&D investments because of the R&D tax 
credit. An increase in their R&D investments will not 
affect their total subsidy. Only firms that would invest 
less than the cap in absence of the tax credit, have 
their marginal R&D cost affected.  
 
Our main findings may be summarized as follows:  
• Firms that previously invested less than the cap 
increase their R&D more than firms that previously 
invested above the cap.  
• Firms that previously did not invest in R&D are 
more likely to start investing in R&D after 
SkatteFUNN was introduced. 
• The effect of SkatteFUNN appears to be real in 
terms of increasing R&D man-years and increased 
used of skilled labour given output level. 
• The estimated positive additionality is mainly 
driven by firms that did little R&D prior to 
SkatteFUNN. 
• The additionality effect is strongest in small, low-
tech and relatively low-skilled firms, i.e. firms that 
traditionally did little R&D. 
• SkatteFUNN has not had a strong impact on R&D in 
cooperation with universities, colleges and research 
institutes. 
• Theory suggests that the additionality should be 
higher in the longer run. Our results do not give a 
clear answer to whether this is the case.  
• Self-reported additionality in applications and final 
reports, and additionality assessments from 
application processors are qualitatively consistent 
with the econometric results  
 
In sum, we interpret the empirical evidence to be 
consistent with the Norwegian R&D tax credit being 
effective in stimulating private R&D investments.  
 
The results are broadly consistent across the data 
sources and the model specifications we use. However, 
one should bear in mind that the identification strategy 
is not fully “waterproof”, and that a causal 
interpretation of our findings relies itself on 
assumptions that are not innocuous. Moreover, the 
large estimated additionality effect is mainly driven by 
firms that did very little R&D prior to SkatteFUNN. The 
estimates have considerable uncertainty, and the 
magnitude of the estimates is also sensitive to non-
trivial choices made in sample construction and model 
specification. One should therefore exert caution in 
putting too much weight on quantitative results from 
this analysis. Having said that, our estimates of how 
much R&D that is generated per krone in forgone 
taxes, span from 1.3 to 2.9. There is considerable 
uncertainty associated with these estimates, and they 
are not independent, since they rest on variations of 
the same identification strategy. The uncertainty is 
therefore associated to the whole interval, and does 
not vanish if one chooses some “midpoint” estimate. 
However, if we were to give a single best guess, we 
would say that one krone in support through 
7. Conclusions  
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SkatteFUNN generates around two kroner in private 
R&D. 
 
We may sum up by paraphrasing Zvi Griliches (1986): 
The evidence presented here should not be interpreted 
as “proving” that SkatteFUNN causes firms to increase 
their R&D investments, but rather as representing 
some prima facie evidence in support of such an 
interpretation. 
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